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21 May 1984

NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

USSR ATTEMPTS TO MEDIATE SYRIAN-IRAQI DISPUTE

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 216, 31 Mar-6 Apr 84 p 3

[Text] Last month, the Soviet Union practically and forcefully entered the domain of the Iran-Iraq War. It did so in an attempt to isolate Iran in the Arab world and solidify the Arab position. High-level Arab sources have told AL-MAJALLAH that Haydar 'Aliev, a member of the politbureau of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, who visited Damascus in the middle of last month, has discussed with Syrian officials the matter of reopening the Iraqi oil pipeline passing through Syrian territory, which was closed by the Syrians 2 years ago.

The sources said that the Syrian officials were favorable to 'Aliev's request and "promised him a good response." The Syrian officials also told their important Soviet guest that the dispute was limited to the question of Syria's percentage return from opening the pipeline. It has been noted that the closing of the Iraqi pipeline passing through has worsened the economic crisis in Iraq, which arose when the port of al-Basrah was closed by the war in Iran. Iraq was left with nothing but one pipeline through Turkish territory. It is currently being expanded.

Moreover, the Syrian authorities have begun to expel large numbers of Iranians, some of whom were on their way to Lebanon via Syria and some of whom live in Syria. According to information obtained by AL-MAJALLAH, about 2000 Iranians have been expelled. "Volunteers" from the Iranian "Revolutionary Guard" moved through Syria into Lebanon in the summer of 1982 in order to take part in resistance to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Many reports have been heard concerning the disputes between them and the Syrian authorities that arose when they posted pictures of Khomeyni in the capital of Damascus. However, Syrian officials did not begin to expel these Iranians to Tehran until last month.

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

MEDIATION IN SYRIAN-PLO DISPUTE DEEMED FAILURE

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 331, 26 Mar 84 p 26

[Article: "Syria Refuses to Allow Payment of the Salaries of 5000 Cadres from Among Fatah's Members"]

[Text] Tunis--At a special session with a number of Arab journalists, Mr Yasir 'Arafat was asked about the veracity of reports concerning mediation efforts currently underway with the aim of reconciling him with Syria. He was also asked about his position on such reconciliation.

Abu 'Ammar said, "Who said I had chosen enmity with Syria? Who said I did not know its geographical and political importance? Do you believe I do not know whether it is better for me to be in office 23 in Damascus or in Hammam al-Shatt in Tunis?"

Then Abu 'Ammar began to recount the efforts he had exerted for the sake of normal relations with Syria, beginning with the story of his arrest in Damascus on the anniversary of the start of the revolution, and ending with his expulsion from Damascus about a year ago, when he was treated as if he were any normal suspect.

In presenting what he had to say, Abu 'Ammar said, "I have never had any conditions for preserving good and positive relations with the Syrian government. I have had only one demand: they should not try to control Palestinian decision-making. I cannot permit this as long as I live and am able to struggle for the sake of the preservation of the independence of the PLO and the Palestinian revolution. Aside from that, I am prepared to make any concession. Superficialities do not concern me. My position does not concern me. What concerns me is to be faithful to the principal victory achieved by the Palestinian people, which is represented by their ability to have an independent opinion and take an independent position."

This is the opinion of Abu 'Ammar, who has been standing on the confrontation line with the Syrian regime since the siege of Beirut. The position of the other members of the Fatah central committee is no different from his, although there sometimes might seem to be a difference in the tactical view for dealing with the situation. This difference of opinion has generated false interpretations of the visit to Damascus by Faruq al-Qadumi (Abu Lutf), a member of the

Fatah central committee and head of the political department of the PLO. Some have gone so far as to relate the story of the details of the agreement between Syria and the PLO, while imagination has caused others to cast doubt on the position of the Fatah central committee.

AL-DUSTUR asked a Palestinian source with direct knowledge of the details of Palestinian -- Syrian relations about the latest developments on this level. The source replied that nothing had changed at all. He said the only development was Syria's realization that it could not replace Mr Yasir 'Arafat by old methods, now that the Palestinian people have rallied around him. Consequently, Syria will try new ways of achieving the same goal.

The source added that Abu Lutf's visit had been completely unsuccessful. In addition, it basically was not intended as a vehicle for discussing the essence of Palestinian-Syrian relations. Rather, it fell within his responsibilities as head of the political department of the PLO. Since the headquarters of the office is still in Damascus, a visit by its chief is a very ordinary matter.

While he was in Damascus, it was natural for Abu Lutf to conduct contacts aimed at alleviating the tension and resolving some related administrative issues, especially the matter of assuring the allowances and salaries of the Fatah personnel living in Syria, who have gone 4 months without collecting their salaries because of Syria's conditions. Syria has asked that it be given complete documentation on these persons, including detailed information about them and pictures of them. The Fatah movement has rejected this demand, which it considers interference in its natural affairs and an attempt on the part of the intelligence agencies to uncover the movement's organization in Syria.

Another Palestinian source has said that Syria hopes to compel these persons to join the rebel movement by keeping their salaries from reaching them. Given the dreadful inflation in Syria, it is not easy for a family to last 4 months without any income.

The source added that both the Syrian government and the rebels were surprised when they learned that there were about 5000 Fatah employees. This means that the entire Fatah organization in Syria is still loyal to Yasir 'Arafat, although the rebels have been able to control military sectors.

Moreover, Palestinian circles have asked just how serious the talk about alternate leadership is, since even in Damascus Abu 'Ammar possesses several times the support of all his enemies. Of course, these enemies have nothing worthy of mention outside the Syrian capital.

Since Abu 'Ammar has had no luck in working out a solution to this administrative problem, talk about solving the political problems is nothing more than the aspirations of some.

The information possessed by AL-DUSTUR confirms that the Syrian regime's position on Mr Yasir 'Arafat has not changed. The Syrian government is still trying to drive him away. If it fails, it will try to realize the idea of alternate leadership. If that fails, it will not hesitate to work for the elimination of the PLO.

The Syrian regime will change its position in one case only: if Abu 'Ammar declares his "repentance", criticizes himself publicly, and comes to Damascus with his head bowed. This will never occur. It is not surprising that Abu 'Ammar has recently been repeating often the famous statement by Abu 'Ali Iyad: "Let us die standing, and not bow down."

The Palestinian-Syrian dispute is not limited to the Fatah movement. The battle for control over Palestinian decision-making is continuing. Within this context, elements belonging to 'Abd-al-Fattah Ghanim, who is loyal to Syria, launched an attack on the offices of the Palestine Liberation Front in Ba'labakk. As a result, two of those defending the office were martyred after managing to stop the attack.

In the same context, an attempt was made in Damascus last week to kidnap Abu Saji, a member of the central committee of the Liberation Front.

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

IRAN CONTINUES REJECTION OF ARAB MEDIATION

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 50, 24 Mar 84 p 13

[Article by Diyab Nabihani: "Tehran Opposed the Arab Foreign Ministers Before They Began"]

[Text] On Wednesday, 14 March, the emergency conference of Arab foreign ministers was concluded after a 1-day meeting in Baghdad devoted to discussing the Iraqi-Iranian war and remedying the critical situation arising from it. The conference issued a statement in which it pointed to Iranian excesses and called for a just and honorable peace which will bring an end to the bloodshed that has occurred continuously since the onset of the war on 4 September 1980 and will lead to neighborly relations between Iraq and Iran based on nonintervention in the internal affairs of the two countries. The statement condemns Iran for its continued attempts to cross Iraq's international borders and occupy its territory. The conference formed a committee made up of foreign ministers from Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Jordan, Morocco, and the Yemen Arab Republic as well as the secretary general of the Arab League to assume responsibility for monitoring the implementation of the resolutions contained in the conference statement and coordinate international measures, initiatives, and communications aimed at stopping the war and maintaining peace and stability in the region. The committee will meet in Tunisia on the 29th of this month to draft a plan for its international activities. It is perhaps premature to pass judgment on the effectiveness or success of this committee, especially with regard to its efforts to stimulate international mediation activity. And despite the fact that the committee has not yet begun its activities, it has before it a clear Iranian position it can consider a point of departure for its efforts. This position is represented by the Iranian side's determination to continue the war and reject any proposals or compromises that do not meet with the announced Iranian conditions for ending the war. The Iranian Foreign Ministry issued a statement in which it rejected the appeal addressed to Iran by the conference of Arab foreign ministers to declare an immediate cease fire. The statement labeled such meetings as "political efforts that will come to nothing."

Moreover, the signs of acceptance by the Iranian regime of the principle of mediation have all but disappeared while there are plenty of signs of a sharp and dangerous escalation of the war. A spokesman for the general command of the Iraqi armed forces confirmed last Saturday that information available to

the Iraqi command indicates the approach of the new Iranian attack expected to the east of al-Basrah. Western information media--particularly American media--have tried to exaggerate the size of the human concentration that the Iranian regime has mobilized for this purpose. At the same time, the commander of the Third Iraqi Corps in the region east of al-Basrah confirmed to the semi-official Iraqi newspaper AL-THAWRAH the substance of the statement by the Iraqi military spokesman concerning the availability of information about the Iranians' completion of their military and personnel preparations to begin the attack on Iraq's international border.

Observers see a connection between Khomeyni's seclusion for a period of 3 weeks from 17 March to 7 April and the new Iranian attack because of the many times that Khomeyni's seclusion has been linked to an Iranian attack on the Iraqi border. In addition, observers point to the fact that last year at the same time Iran launched a big attack on the occasion of the Noruz holidays (the Iranian New Year on 21 March). They also point to the decision by Khomeyni himself to deny passes to the conscription forces, the members of the guard, and the Iranian Army to spend the holiday period with their friends and relatives.

Informed political sources told AL-TADAMUN that the Iraqi armed forces, which are superior in weapons and equipment, are fully prepared to confront the Iranian attack and occupy extremely strong positions. These sources pointed to the superiority of Iraqi weapons to those of Iran, especially in the area of air power. Iraq owns more than 500 fighter planes and over 325 helicopters while Iran does not possess weapons in these quantities or at the same level of effectiveness and sophistication. Teheran understands this fact and feels it on the battle fronts. Therefore, the regime ventures Iran's human resource in a war that has become an internal game and a means in the struggle for power to the point that the Iranian government has become a prisoner of it. These sources continue in their analysis to deal with the meaning of the Iranian regime's use of large human concentrations to counter Iraqi superiority. They point out that in doing this, Iran is trying to create a balance in the battles it fights with Iraq so that it can produce a state of parity or superiority in the war, taking advantage to a great extent of the high rate of illiteracy in Iran and throughout the Iranian rural areas. This has given the Iranian regime an opportunity to send tens of thousands of illiterates to the battle fronts with incentives that have become well known. They also point to the closing of the schools and universities for 4 years and the forcing of the students into the battles that have so far slaughtered thousands of them.

Therefore, anticipation and waiting are the hallmark of the current position on the battle fronts and the countdown to the Iranian attack is nearing zero. Meanwhile, limited battles continue at intervals along lines of contact east of al-Basrah and in part of oil-rich Majnun Island located in the middle of Lake al-Huwayzah. This island has become besieged on three sides after the Iraqi forces cut it in two. The Iraqi air force is playing an active and damaging role in oppressing the Iranian forces in the island's interior. In this connection, observers point out that Iraq is itself in no hurry to decide the situation on the island now that it has established control over it.

Its aim is to force the Iranians to commit additional large numbers of their forces as exposed targets for Iraq's planes and easy prey for its heavy fire.

The question that is being asked repeatedly by observers centers around the outcomes of the expected battles on the Iraqi-Iranian front east of al-Basrah and east of Misan. While these outcomes will remain confined within the geographical space of the two countries, they will lead to results that are in part calculable and in part uncalculable. The war is taking place in a region that is fragile, incohesive, and highly flammable and perishable. Therefore, Western European and Japanese circles cannot hide their growing anxiety and fears over the threat to navigation and international trade in the Gulf region and the Strait of Hormuz. Nothing causes more concern among the Europeans and the Japanese than seeing the conflict fall back to the Gulf and extend to the shores of the Strait of Hormuz through which five world supplies of oil pass.

As for Baghdad, it is continuing its strategic strangulation of Iran through the blockade it has imposed on the Iranian ports and Kharj Island on the east coast of the Gulf. It is determined that there will be freedom of movement and navigation in the Gulf for everyone or for no one, to use the words of Iraq's First Deputy Prime Minister Yasin Ramadan. While warning of a new Iranian military venture, the Iraqi military spokesman reflected the determination of the Iraqi leadership to strike at specified targets deep in Iran and outside the battle zone.

The possibilities of an escalation are growing day by day and the danger that the fighting will move outside the geographical extent of the Iraqi-Iranian front is real. Moreover, regional and international mediation activity to end the war appears to be restricted because of the Iranians' stubbornness and their insistence on the choice of continuing and expanding the war. This war threatens to ignite the area and destroy every living thing in it, to use the words of Shaykh Ahmad ibn Sayf Aal Thani, Qatari minister of state for foreign affairs.

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SYRIA CLOSELY WATCHES LAUSANNE CONFERENCE

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 370, 24 Mar 84 p 14

[Article by Marwan al-Muhayini: "Damascus Will Not Be Neutral If the Lausanne Conference Fails"]

[Text] Damascus followed the news of the national Lebanese dialogue conference in Lausanne with anxiety and concern, concentrating on the necessity of making the conference succeed as the only means of completing the correction of the Lebanese situation begun by the nullification of the 17 May Agreement. Authorized Syrian sources stated that Damascus sees no alternative to the success of the Lebanese dialogue to complete the steps toward reconciliation. The sources assume that the deliberating parties in Lausanne carry the Lebanese nation as much as they represent the tragedy of this ill-fated country. They consequently assume that the means of escape from the dilemma has become clear and additional options and exertions are no longer possible. These sources stated that the parties at the Lausanne conference have no choice but to succeed in their dialogue. This is because their failure is not permissible in any way.

The observers in the Syrian capital understand the fears of the failure of the dialogue. Such a failure would lead to a return to the previous bad condition in Lebanon when it could have been remedied in the framework of the dialogue facilitated by the meeting between Presidents al-Asad and al-Jumayyil and the nullification of the 17 May Agreement. In other words, the failure of the dialogue means no less than a return to the fighting and increased opportunities for dangerous possibilities and expectations. It is precisely the events and effects of this situation that Damascus desired and worked to help Lebanon and the region avoid. It directed all its political and military resources toward urging the Lebanese sides to negotiate in order to arrive at administrative formulas capable of transcending all reasons and incentives for the war that destroyed Lebanon. In this, Syria hoped to rely on convincing the conferees of Lebanon's urgent need for a national reconciliation and persuading them to abandon the dialogue of arms and artillery for the dialogue of accord and agreement, laying the foundation for the new balanced democratic Lebanon on the "no-win-no-lose" basis that Syria has relied on all along.

Thus, the Syrian information media and various Syrian circles have stressed

the idea of making the conference succeed during the Lausanne dialogue. They have stopped short of attacking any Lebanese faction, contenting themselves--in addition to concentrating on the necessity of the dialogue's success--with condemning attempts to disrupt the security situation from whatever source. They have pointed out that any obstacle to the desired solution in Lausanne necessarily arises in coordination and collusion with American and Israeli efforts aimed at returning Lebanon to its previous deteriorated condition once again.

Based on Syria's feelings of special national and pan-Arab responsibility toward Lebanon and its people, Damascus cannot fail to attach importance to the second step after the nullification of the agreement with Israel, which is the success of the dialogue.

The prevailing belief here in Damascus is that the renewal of fighting should the Lausanne conference fail would mean much to Damascus. More precisely, the failure of the dialogue would be a setback by which Washington and Israel would make up for the Lebanese-Syrian-Arab victory achieved in the nullification of the 17 May Agreement. This is a situation which Syria will not allow to happen. It will work earnestly to avoid and fight such a development by various means if it occurs. In addition, the failure of the dialogue would mean that Lebanon would enter into a new phase of distinctive struggle, in which Syria could not remain neutral. Because such a failure would give rise to a new form of Syrian interaction with the sides that prevented the success of the dialogue.

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

BISHARAH ON GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL'S ACCOMPLISHMENTS, FAILURES

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 4 Apr 84 p 9

[Interview with 'Abdallah Bisharah, Gulf Cooperation Council general secretary, by Ghazi al-Jasim: "'Abdallah Bisharah: Political Independence Cannot Be Secured without Military Strength; Cooperation Council Is Sacrifice and Has Its Cost; We Respect Experiences and Views of Others"]

[Text] Three years have passed so far since the founding of the Arab Gulf States Cooperation Council. During this process, there have been accomplishments and gains that could not have been made in the absence of the national will, the sound direction and the aspirations for a better future for the Gulf states and peoples. It is no exaggeration to point out all the obstacles and difficulties that have faced and confronted the Gulf movement since its first steps. But the sincere resolution and perseverance have made it possible to overcome the obstacles and surpass the difficulties.

Though this is some of what has been accomplished, it does not represent the full picture as observers see it. The area's peoples still face tasks they have to undertake in order to complete the process, to bring the experience to maturity and to strengthen its mainstays. 'Abdallah Bisharah, the Cooperation Council general secretary, is perhaps one of those who have a complete view of the Cooperation Council experience. Consequently, he is qualified to put his finger on the weaknesses and failures and on the means to get rid of the weaknesses and failures.

AL-WATAN interviewed the Cooperation Council general secretary in Riyadh, discussed with him the area's affairs and concerns and heard him state with the frankness of an official and with the courage of a son of the Arab Gulf where and how we have succeeded and what is required of all--states, peoples and agencies--in order that the Gulf may stay clear off the spheres of influence and free of the dangers of domination and may continue to move forward in building its progress, security and stability.

[Question] The third anniversary of the founding of the Cooperation Council's General Secretariat will come next May. Where, in your opinion, have the Council's successes and failures been during the short past period and where have the accomplishments been equal to the planned aspirations and hopes?

[Answer] As I see them, the positive features lie in the fact that for the first time ever, the six Gulf states have been able to enter within a single political, economic, social and security framework and that for the first time ever the inherited and traditional geopolitical map of the Gulf has been reexamined. This is in contrast with what used to happen in the past when each state mapped out its policy separately. This has ended now and for the first time ever, there is a collective position at the political, security and diplomatic levels. I will not say that this position has changed the balance of powers because I don't want to use such words. But it has changed the general features of the traditional situation. I believe that this is a major accomplishment at the Gulf level. At the Arab level, this position can be considered an accomplishment because it represents a shift from fragmentation and estrangement to cohesion. We have thus eliminated one of the barriers creating division.

As for the other party of the question concerning the obstacles, the objectives we had aspired for and which we have not been able to achieve are:

First, we have not created a public opinion and have not been able to establish an information base, i.e., a circle in which the Cooperation Council stands. This circle is an information circle that criticizes, confronts and discusses the causes of slowness, for example, in some spheres and of haste in other spheres. What I mean is that we need a public opinion base or circle that questions us and questions the executive agencies. This is what we all aspire for. This failure is due to many reasons. We in the General Secretariat are not responsible for all of them. The Gulf media are also partly responsible. On the occasion, we are happy to see a Gulf journalist come to the General Secretariat for the first time. We can thus build bridges with the media and can create the public opinion which must exist to control, criticize and bring to account. Second, the local authorities have not realized that the Cooperation Council is a sacrifice and has its cost. This cost means that local laws must be modified to absorb the new phase, namely the phase of collective action, of implementing the economic agreement and of customs unity. We now have customs unity and there are no customs fees between the six states. We have a single customs tariff. When we sent a field team from the General Secretariat and from the six member states to the Gulf states to study and examine things on the spot, this team felt that the collective spirit on the local and bureaucratic levels was not effective. But generally, the General Secretariat is faced with observations from the member states, which say that we are moving at a faster pace than the agencies can. This is the reason that makes me feel that these agencies have not yet comprehended the horizons of the phase. The agencies may be right and we are now reexamining this issue.

[Question] You have a well-known opinion that has already been published, namely the opinion that the small countries cannot fight the means of domination. Have the 3 years of the Council's life been able to keep domination away from the area's states?

[Answer] I would not say that they have kept away domination. But they have made two things clear, and I will be explicit on this issue. The first thing is that the Gulf states are located in the most dangerous strategic

area in the world. There are four wars surrounding us in the Middle East: The Lebanese war, the Iraq-Iran war, the Afghanistan war and the war in the Horn of Africa. Despite this and even though the area is fraught with concerns and with the daily threats that come because of the local geography and from the major powers, the Cooperation Council member states have not developed the hysteria of fear and have not succumbed to the temptation of relying on others to secure their independence and to ensure their sovereignty and their survival, meaning that despite all these dangers, the thinking and the emphasis are on self-reliance. This is the thinking formulated by the second session of the Higher Council in Riyadh and reaffirmed by the third session in Bahrain and the fourth session in Qatar. Self-reliance means excluding any possibility of seeking the help of others to defend our countries. The second thing insofar as domination is concerned is that attempts were made in the 1960's under the shah's administration to impose such domination, and this is certain. Domination means that you have your independence but there are limits to the sphere of this independence, meaning that you can act within certain bounds only. With our collective framework and with our efforts to crystallize our self-reliance, we reject this domination. Domination is not rejected with diplomatic action alone but is rejected and fought when diplomacy is coupled with security preparedness. For the first time, diplomacy in the Gulf Cooperation Council member states is tied to the security requirements. The security preparations are one of the accomplishments of the Cooperation Council. We are now moving with rapid steps to secure the special means to link the diplomatic action with the security element in order to disperse the ability of others to impose their domination on us.

[Question] In a previous statement you made in 1981, you expressed your hope that the causes of the disagreement between the foreign policy of the Sultanate of Oman and the foreign policy of the other Council member states would be eliminated and you noted that those causes were not at all Arab causes. What has been done on this issue?

[Answer] Before the founding of the Cooperation Council, each of the Council's six member states had its views and its calculations. All those views and calculations were in accord and in harmony with the local national view, meaning that Oman had its circumstances and calculations in Dhofar. Those calculations dictated Oman's foreign policy. The other state, Bahrain, also had circumstances which dictated calculations and views that befitted Bahrain. The same goes for Kuwait and for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. When the Cooperation Council was founded in 1981, the kings, amirs and leaders had six experiences facing them, each experience with its own calculations and interpretations. Through action and after 3 years and 4 summit conferences, 16 meetings held by the ministers of foreign affairs since the first summit conference and after other continuous meetings, we have been able to achieve what we may call conformity, not consensus but conformity. Conformity is tantamount to a general position by the six states. I am not saying that all the states have changed their position. However, they have taken general considerations into account in their foreign policy, meaning that there is a common understanding and a general diplomacy. We can now say that there is a general Gulf diplomacy. This diplomacy is different, of course, from foreign policy. There is a difference between foreign policy and diplomacy. There is a unified Gulf diplomacy that has emanated from this conformity. After 3 years since the

Council's founding I can say that a large degree of the contradiction and estrangement in foreign policy has been eliminated and that we have moved much closer to each other in spirit, method and tendency. However, we continue to be six states, each with its independence. This is why we say that we are a semi-confederacy and not a federal or confederal group. This means that every state maintains its local and external [policy] characteristics, even though these external characteristics have become very close to each other. In other words, the Cooperation Council has introduced into the Gulf new concepts that were not experienced before. The main concept of this change will be the concept of building a Gulf military force that eliminates any fear of domination, of intervention of any kind and of a special relationship with any foreign side.

We have not brought any new theories. All that there is to the matter is that the practices are new and these practices will arouse controversy and this controversy will arouse the issue of the political and material cost of these practices. But there is no alternative to these practices and no political independence can be secured without military strength.

[Question] On the basis of the above, under the canopy of the current circumstances being experienced by the area and on the premise of strengthening the relations between the area's states and of keeping the dangers of foreign intervention away from it, can a collective declaration be issued to ask the fleets present along these states' shores and the military bases present on their territories to leave the area, considering that the area's states are capable of defending themselves and protecting their national independence and sovereignty?

[Answer] We have issued a statement in the wake of each Gulf summit, especially the first summit which introduced two new things:

1. Adherence to the policy of nonalignment which has become one of the cornerstones and prominent features of the Cooperation Council's policy. We cling to this policy.
2. The final statement calling for self-reliance in defending the national independence and soil of the area's states because the area's security situation is the responsibility of the area's citizens and states, not that of any other party. These are acknowledged principles.

These principles have become main features. As to whether we are capable of securing the independence of our six states in the face of any possible attack by any side, I will say that our military cooperation is still in the initial phase and will take time. However, we are in a time in which anybody who thinks that there are those who will save or defend him or who will shoulder the responsibility on his behalf is wrong. Events have demonstrated that one can only rely on oneself. I believe that we have learned many lessons from modern history and from the current events. This is the philosophy and position we follow.

[Question] The Cooperation Council member states' security treaty has aroused reactions in some of these member states and it has been recently circulated that there is an alternative formula that satisfies all the sides involved. How true and accurate are these circulated reports?

[Answer] I would like to clarify an important fact that must not be brushed aside. The draft security treaty is one that deals with ordinary crimes and has nothing to do with politics. It contains a lot of words and phrases but they are only rhetorical. Essentially, it is an agreement that regulates the means to uproot and wipe out ordinary crime.

There are interpretations. Kuwait has said that if a Kuwaiti citizen commits crimes such as forging checks in one of the other five states and then flees to Kuwait, it will try him and will not hand him over to the country in which he forged the checks.

[Question] Another issue has been raised regarding the pursuit of criminals in case they cross beyond the borders of the country in which they have committed the crime.

[Answer] No, this issue has not been raised. The issue raised is the issue of the site of trial of the accused and of whether he should be tried in the country where he committed the crime or in his country if he manages to get to his country. As to what you have said about pursuing criminals, this point was contained in one of the various drafts of the treaty. But this point has been dropped in the latest draft. I call for political security cooperation.

The security treaty establishes controls for daily conduct and ordinary crime. The ministers of foreign affairs touched on the political security aspect in the meeting they held in Riyadh last January in the wake of the explosions in Kuwait. The issue of political security cooperation was raised at that meeting, with the intention of providing protection against political crimes in the wake of what had happened in Kuwait and Bahrain and had almost happened in Qatar. But this is something we have not achieved. Why haven't we achieved it? I say because we are new in this sphere. We in the General Secretariat are exerting serious efforts to establish political security in the area so that we may not be surprised by political crimes.

[Question] But there is in the area a real danger of coloring some political issues with the color of ordinary crime.

[Answer] How can this happen?

Is it possible to accuse somebody of murder when he has not killed anybody?

Yes, there can be cases of the sort, keeping in mind that the judiciary system in some of the Gulf states is not advanced.

I imagine that any politician can be accused of various things, regardless of whether there is or there isn't a treaty. However, I believe political ethics still exist and values still exist and that it is difficult to accuse a man just because of political disagreement. I cannot imagine such a thing and it is out of the question insofar as Gulf ethics are concerned.

Insofar as the security treaty is concerned, they have asked me in Kuwait: Is this reasonable? Suppose we get together in a session and say that we don't like the situation in Bahrain, the UAE or the Kingdom. Does this mean that this treaty will drag us to the UAE or Bahrain to be punished there?

My answer was that the treaty does not touch on issues of the sort but deals with ordinary crime and how to contain it.

What I have been hearing distorts the treaty and is untrue. I imagine that the treaty has been misread, with good intentions, and has, with my respect for all opinions, been presented poorly by the media. When clamor was raised regarding the treaty, nobody stood to search for the truth. I have spoken on this issue but my voice has been lost in the uproar.

[Question] Oil is the only source of national income for the Council member states. Is there planning and coordination to preserve this wealth and to maintain its prices in the world market?

Are there plans and is there coordination to find national income alternatives parallel to oil so that the oil market may not be exposed to economic crises and shocks? At the same time and considering that oil is our sole resource, can it be processed instead of being exported as crude oil?

[Answer] There is an oil coordination policy among the ministers of oil and there is a general understanding on oil policy at the regional and international levels. This policy creates a climate of international stability insofar as oil issues are concerned. As for the alternatives, there are two things. There is an agricultural strategy that has been introduced into the Gulf area for the first time and that was approved by the ministers of agriculture in their meeting in Doha last January. This strategy will give us some kind of food security stores. We are now in the process of securing the needed storage sites. The second thing is expansion in agriculture, especially in the production of white meats, poultry, milk and its derivatives.

On the industrial side, there is now a unified industrial plan insofar as the heavy industries--petrochemicals and aluminum--are concerned. The search goes on for a joint investment policy and we are at the beginning in this sphere. The issue of the search for alternatives to oil is still in the initial phase. What is good is that there has been coordination in this regard.

[Question] Don't you think that some of the Cooperation Council member states impose some restrictions on their citizens insofar as engaging in business is concerned? How can this issue be settled at the regional level when it has not been settled at the level of the individual states so far?

[Answer] To answer this question, we must point out that the economic agreement is divided into three parts. We have begun with the easy part, namely the customs union.

The other point is that we have levied a fee on imports, with this fee amounting as a minimum to 4 percent of the value of the goods imported. The six countries have adopted this percentage, which was proposed by Kuwait. We thus have a customs union.

The most difficult thing in the agreement is freedom of commerce and movement. Freedom of commerce in the sense that we understand is that it is possible to import and export. This is something we still hope to deal with ultimately, namely in the third phase which will begin after 4 years.

The phase we have tackled is the phase of freedom of industry. Kuwait can set up a factory or a farm in the kingdom. But what it cannot do is to purchase the land for this factory or this farm. This year, we hope to reach a solution to the problem of the right to ownership by establishing rules for it as an initial phase. The most difficult thing is the issue of trade in the Gulf. Even though the issues of defense and security are new issues, they are easier to tackle because they do not touch local bases in each state. These bases have their privileges and their institutions and will not easily agree to eliminate the barriers and privileges. Our opinion is, as I have already noted, that we should leave the issue until the final phase of the implementation of the agreement and that we should start with the earlier issue. Despite this, problems still exist. The Cooperation Council's task is not at all easy. It is a political task that is based on bringing the political positions closer to each other. The adoption of a unified defense policy, for example, costs a lot. But it does not hurt certain sectors, such as the merchants' sector, the fishermen's sector or the sector of agency owners. We are aware of the sensitivity aroused by implementation of the unified economic agreement between the Council member states and it is difficult to eliminate all the barriers at once.

[Question] It is noticed that there is a difference in the foreign policy of the Cooperation Council member states. There are states that have balanced international relations whereas other states have relations with certain parties only, such as the United States and the West and do not have relations with the other side. Does not the General Secretariat have proposals to unify the directions of foreign policy on national bases and in a manner that serves the interest of the Arab countries and of the Cooperation Council member states?

[Answer] Insofar as the Arab causes are concerned, the Cooperation Council member states are in the lead and they need nobody to defend their positions. But what you are talking about is diplomatic representation between some of the Council member states and some of the socialist countries. In this regard, I will say that we are six states, each with its calculations and views. We cannot discard the legitimacy of their experiences. It is true that some of the Cooperation Council member states do not have diplomatic representation in some major capitals. But there is diplomatic contact with all. The only state with embassies in the socialist countries is Kuwait. This is excellent. These are excellent bridges from which the Council member states benefit and which they evaluate and develop. Contact between the Cooperation Council member states and the socialist countries is not cut off. There are contacts which take place through me personally when I pass by Kuwait and there are other contacts that take place through representatives abroad, meaning that the UN permanent representative of each state has contacts with the representatives of the UN member states. There is a difference between contact and representation. Each of the six states has its views, and the Cooperation Council cannot interfere with them.

There is understanding of the views of each side.

[Question] Isn't the Cooperation Council weakened by the fact that five of its member states do not have relations with the socialist countries?

[Answer] This could be so if the Council were involved in the framework of the major powers' struggle for influence, and such involvement would undoubtedly be a blow to everything we have been saying daily about self-reliance, about clinging to the policy of positive nonalignment and about dialogue and communication with all without any complexes and despite the absence of diplomatic representation. The thing we are concerned with at the General Secretariat is to steer the Cooperation Council clear of the struggle of the major powers and their spheres of influence. This is what should be fought. When representation or absence of representation is coupled with the policy of adherence to positive nonalignment, it insures credibility. What destroys credibility is to claim to adhere to the policy of nonalignment while entering at the same time the arenas of the struggle between the major powers. We in the Cooperation Council are eager to steer clear of the spheres of influence.

[Question] You are speaking of steering clear of the conflicts of the major powers when at the same time the major powers have bases in some of the Council member states.

[Answer] I do not believe that this is 100 percent compatible with the truth. I also believe that we must have the ability to translate the issues of self-reliance on a large scale and must manage our affairs in such a way as not to give any foreign side the justification to volunteer to defend us. This is the answer to the temptations we are facing. It is certain that the major powers desire an area like ours and wish to include us in their spheres of influence. Frankly, there is understanding and awareness of the things I am saying about self-reliance and about not getting involved in the maneuvers and contacts of the major powers.

[Question] What is your opinion of the maneuvers that were conducted jointly by one of the Council member states and the U.S. forces?

[Answer] The General Secretariat does not formulate the foreign policy of the Council member states. Those who formulate this policy are their majesties and highnesses the kings and the amirs who have formulated this policy in four summit conferences. This policy is based on:

1. Adherence to the policy of nonalignment.
2. Self-reliance.
3. The principle that the responsibility of security and stability is a responsibility shouldered by the member states.

We in the General Secretariat follow these steps and do not wish to swerve from them.

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

POTENTIAL FOR ISRAELI MILITARY ACTION DISCUSSED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1433, 20 Apr 84 pp 24, 25

[Article by Amin al-Siba'i: "The Probabilities for Sudden War!"]

[Text] What would the Israeli reaction vis-a-vis Lebanon and Syria be if it were decided to return the Arab Deterrent Force to its former positions in Lebanon? Would Israel enter into a new preventive war under the pretext of standing up in the face of Syrian expansion, or would it annex southern Lebanon once and for all?

These questions were raised in Lebanon and in several Arab capitals last week. They are considered a link in the chain of questions revolving around what steps the Israeli government might take in Lebanon and the region before Israel's parliamentary elections, which are to be held on 23 July.

Official Lebanese and Arab contacts bore these expectations, some of which were based on international warnings and information coming largely from the Soviet Union, to the capitals of the great nations and the United States in particular. These contacts were a preventive action on the part of the Arab capitals. First of all, their goal was to make the American administration face up to the responsibilities it bears because of its continuing support for Israel in an election year. Secondly, the purpose was to avoid a military disaster, which might occur if the Israelis, as they usually do before elections, turn to playing with war in order to shift the electoral balance inside the country.

Despite the waning of the hopes the Arab states usually place on the American role in the Middle East, especially in an election year, the Arab side has become very eager to spell out for the American side with perfect clarity just what its reactions will be to any act Israel might undertake. The Arab side has begun to see clearly that Israel has taken or will take a long series of political and military decisions in order to change the current situation in the Middle East in accordance with its interests. In all this, Israel depends on the green light of the American elections, which is coming from President Reagan and his most prominent competitors for the office of the presidency.

According to the determination sent by the Arabs via diplomatic and political channels to the great nations, many indicators and such circulating information indicate that an Israeli decision to undertake an emergency or exceptional war somewhere in the region is currently being discussed and evaluated in Tel Aviv.

According to these indicators, the war between Israel and the Arab region really has not stopped, though it has sometimes seemed to be quiescent in the field. In fact, it was and still is going on in other ways.

Outside the scope of tanks, military machinery, and aircraft, the closest aspect of Israel's continuing war is found in the policy of controlling and separating southern Lebanon. As the Lebanese memorandum to the UN security council said, Israel aims to separate and annex southern Lebanon. Moreover, the roots of partition and civil warfare are to be nurtured in preparation for reaching the program of division and statelets. The initiative of the legitimate Lebanese authorities and all their institutions is to be frustrated, and then Lebanon's decision-making power will be expropriated. Any Lebanese-Syrian or Lebanese-Arab agreement that could replace the tragic situation, which has existed for almost 10 years in all parts of Lebanon, will be absolutely rejected.

In addition to that, Western information has spoken about serious Israeli preparations for a war intended to settle the score with Syria in the Biqa'. The construction of settlements on the West Bank is also to be expanded, and greater and more comprehensive Judaization is to be carried out in Jerusalem. Moreover, expectations and warnings have reached some Arab states in the Gulf concerning a lightning operation to which some of them may be exposed before 23 July, just as happened in Begin's term before the last parliamentary elections.

The American side has been sensitized to the reactions of the Arabs to any military activity Israel might undertake in the next 3 months.

The use of old proposed measures, such as the cutting of diplomatic relations, has been considered the mildest possible response, despite the thorny inter-Arab disputes. As a result of the bitterness aroused by Israel's behavior in the region, expected reactions might reach the point at which the Arabs would open their borders to fedayeen activity inside the occupied territories. American interests in the entire region might be exposed to fundamental dangers whose extent can be determined only with difficulty ahead of time.

The American government has given some assurances, which have not convinced anyone yet, that it will rein in Israel's drive toward limited military activity or war. However, American officials have linked expected developments to surprises that might occur in the field in the region.

Western diplomatic sources have said that Israel is always capable of finding pretexts with which to justify its military operations. For instance, it can make use of fedayeen operations that have recently occurred inside

Israel. In Lebanon, serious talk about the possibility of the return of the Syrian deterrent force to Beirut and the mountains and the failure of American policy in the region is predominating. Such talk can also be used in the service of the military action Israel currently wants or is studying.

A high-level Arab official has revealed the difference between the various expectations concerning the magnitude, place, and goal of Israel's coming military move.

In a private and personal interview, this official said that one aspect of Israel's policy was subject to the war of political and electoral bargaining going on inside the country. This war might convince the Israeli government to repeat the attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor, which was carried out before the last elections in another Arab region.

In this context, military experts estimate that Israel's military studies contain a proposal for a limited military strike against one or more positions in the triangle extending between Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. However, this does not rule out other Arab targets far from Israel's borders, such as the Gulf.

Through this picture, one can understand the content of the letter sent by the Iraqi foreign minister to the general secretary of the Arab League last week. The letter said that Iraq was directing the attention of the Arabs to aggressive plans and intentions that might end with an Israeli strike against its industrial installations.

This official said that Israel was also subject to difficult economic and political calculations and an internal human situation that is still suffering from the effects and losses of the Lebanese war. These factors make it difficult for Israel to launch a comprehensive war against any Arab country this year, because it cannot bear the costs of two wars in less than 2 years. Moreover, it knows that the calculations of any future war will have different results from those of all the previous wars.

The Jordanian minister of information, Mrs Layla Sharaf, took part in this discussion. In a private political interview, she said that she did not see any signs that a comprehensive war would engulf the region, as other parties are saying. Rather, she expects separate military events, some of which might go beyond the limits of small confrontations.

Unlike many others, the Jordanian minister said she thought that for many reasons, Israel would have to take numerous calculations and considerations into account, on both the regional and the international level, before engaging in warfare.

According to Minister Layla Sharaf, on the basis of the information of those who discussed the matter with her, these calculations include the fact that Israel is not able to start a comprehensive war now or before

the parliamentary elections. First of all, Israel has still not digested its human and material losses in Lebanon. It knows full well just how much its society and private structure have been affected by these losses.

Secondly, Israel's entanglement in Lebanon is still not over. Israel cannot start a new war until it has closed the file on its war in Lebanon.

Thirdly, in order for Israel to pick a fight with Syria or Jordan, it must be completely ready for such a decision. So far, it does not possess this readiness, either internally or on the confrontation fronts.

Fourthly, with the exception of the active national resistance, Israel has not been confronted in Lebanon with obstacles resulting from the positions of others. Neither does it suffer from hinderances in the area of applying its projects. Therefore, it cannot be led to risk war by such factors.

Arab parties, including some Palestinian leaders, contributed to the picture presented by the Jordanian minister of information. She agreed with some Lebanese leaders in ruling out comprehensive warfare and in placing the formula of rapid and limited warfare against Arab and Palestinian targets in its place.

These leaders explained the idea of rapid war by saying that it would take the form of intense aerial raids and surprise incursions in several areas in Lebanon, and perhaps in Arab countries far from Israel's borders, in addition to sites where the Palestinian resistance is concentrated.

Israel considers the method of rapid, limited wars both justified and conceivable, because it generates the kind of political and media uproar that serves the domestic political situation, without placing the Israeli army and, consequently, Israel's cities, at the mercy of the Arabs' reaction and Soviet missiles.

While Lebanon will remain an arena for unique military experiments until further notice, the Arab discussion concerning the responsibility of the Americans is becoming sharper and clearer.

In Lebanon, all official and political calculations which were bet on the American rescue project have started to change, despite the existence of political views calling for the country to bide its time until the American presidential elections are over, before shifting to other options.

President Amin al-Jumayyil has turned to the UN security council and asked for resolutions that would halt Israeli control over the south and strengthen the role of the legitimate Lebanese authorities and the international emergency forces in the south. He has rejected every alternative formula, even if it is Lebanese. This step is tantamount to a new determination of a basic way of interacting with the American position which

is always supportive of Israel. It makes use of international institutions instead of direct, bilateral dialogue, as was the case before the cancellation of the 17 May accord.

On the Arab level, in the midst of the hue and cry of disputes, signs of some official activity have appeared. Today, this effort is trying to take the Arab pulse once again with regard to the proposal to hold a comprehensive Arab summit before the summer without prior conditions and evasion, in order to discuss what is happening in Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank, and Jerusalem and to determine a preventive Arab position on any American or European indifference vis-a-vis these subjects or any war Israel might launch.

One can place the written letters sent by King Husayn to President Amin al-Jumayyil and a number of other Arab leaders last week in the framework of the Arab effort aimed at unifying Arab ranks before it is too late.

The Jordanian minister of information, Mrs Layla Sharaf, explained the nature of this activity. She said that King Husayn's letters called for the exploitation of the period of rigidity through which the world is passing today, with the goal of formulating unified Arab positions that will enable the Arab states to speak to the entire world with one voice.

She said that King Husayn believes that the responsibility for America's continued support of Israel and for the way in which the true nature of the American position has been completely ignored in the Middle East lies with the Arab states, which have still done nothing to address the obvious absence of unified Arab positions and statements.

King Husayn did not define the framework for a common Arab understanding of the required positions. Rather, he simply called on the Arab countries to orient themselves toward a unified conception and a unified position as soon as possible.

According to diplomatic sources, it is King Husayn's view that the call for a unified Arab position transcends the disputes and lies far from exceptions and axes, because the next stage will be decisive. During it, it will be necessary for the confrontation to be more comprehensive and effective.

This picture is reinforced by information concerning the efforts being exerted to bring together the points of view of some Arab regimes. If these efforts achieve positive results, especially in the countries that confront Israel, before the Arab foreign ministers meet in Tunis in the middle of next month, a miracle might be achieved in the form of an agreement to hold the Arab summit, which has been postponed repeatedly.

In expectation of small wars launched by Israel and the miracle of agreement on the part of the Arab states, probabilities remain that could subject the region to military and political surprises.

According to the Soviets, things cooking in numerous corners indicate that a desire exists to give Israel a fundamental role in a basic process of change in the region.

Moscow will reply if this change is imposed.

Sources close to the Israeli defense ministry have confirmed that Israel is preparing itself for a probable war that will require the use of non-traditional weapons. Despite the high cost of such readiness, the ministry is tending toward distributing gas masks to the entire population of Israel.

America's promises, which take the form of assurances not to push matters to the brink of war, seem to be mere messages without content or meaning, because those who follow the development of political and official positions in America think Israel is still able to extract whatever American decisions it wants from the candidates for the presidency, without any hindrance or stay.

A prominent Jordanian official summed up the situation by saying that in an election year, Israel can fleece the Americans and carry out everything it plans for the term of each American president. He feared that Israel would acquire another concession from the Americans before those with rightful claims would be able to agree to stop the course of concessions, which proceeds at their expense.

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

SYRIAN CALL TO PLO--AL-MAJALLAH has learned that a high-ranking Syrian official has informed responsible Palestinian parties that Damascus will discuss in the next few days a very important decision having to do with its position vis-a-vis the PLO. It is expected that Syria will send an official invitation to the central committee of the Fatah movement after the decision is issued. The decision is described by Palestinian sources as "positive." A working paper dealing with the regulation of the Palestinian military presence in Syria was recently issued by the "Syrian Fida'i Force", [dabitah] which belongs to intelligence. According to the paper, each Palestinian faction would have one office in Damascus. The remaining Palestinian forces would be transferred to locations near the Jordanian border. [Text] [London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 216, 31 Mar-6 Apr 84 p 3] 12224

CSO: 4404/437

LIBYA

COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC GROWTH RATES DISCUSSED

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 3 Apr 84 p 11

[Article: "AL-QABAS Reviews Horizons of Arab Economy in 1983-84; Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyyah: Shortage of Liquidity Delays Implementation of Investment Projects"]

[Text] The state of recession being experienced by the oil market since 1981, and the subsequent losses embodied in reducing oil revenues, has led to big pressures being exerted on the Libyan economy and to the inevitable reduction of the sums appropriated for investment, in addition to a big decline in the growth rates expected to be witnessed in the next few years.

Local Economy

The most important factors determining the state of the Libyan economy are the level of oil production and the level of oil prices. High production and rising oil prices in the 5 years ending in 1980 led to an accelerated economic growth rate exceeding 20 percent annually.

Expecting this rapid growth rate to continue, the 1981-85 5-year plan contains investments totalling \$62.5 billion dollars, depending on expectations of an economic growth rate of 9.4 percent annually.

The real economic growth retreated from the very high rates it recorded in the late 1970's to nearly 3 percent in 1982 and to a little less than that in 1983.

Inflation

Information pertaining to inflation rates in Libya is not accessible. However, the price increases have reached 17 percent [annually] in recent years. This is due to the high level of public spending, despite the subsidies advanced for numerous commodities.

Development Plan

Libya's ambitious economic development plan has suffered a setback as a result of the decline in oil revenues. Originally, the industrial sector was scheduled to receive 21.5 percent of the spending allocations in the 5-year

plan. However, a change has developed in the priorities, with these priorities shifting toward the emergency needs of self-sufficiency in foodstuffs, especially in the wake of the food shortage of 1982. The objectives of the 1981-85 5-year plan, valued at 18.5 billion Libyan dinars or 62.5 billion are summed up, as already noted, in increasing the gross national product by 9.4 percent [annually] and reducing the oil sector's share in the gross national product from 53 percent to 35.5 percent. The plan expects an annual growth rate of 21.5 percent in industrial production and of 16 percent in the agricultural sector.

A number of major projects have been canceled, delayed or extended for longer periods. All projects, excluding basic projects, were suspended in 1983 and priority was given to the new export industries yielding revenues in foreign currency.

Oil Sector

The oil sector contributes nearly 50 percent of the gross local product and represents the total export revenues. Within OPEC, Libya is the sixth biggest exporter of oil and it has proven oil reserves estimated at nearly 24 billion barrels. According to the current production rate, amounting to 1.1 billion [presumably meaning million] barrels daily, these reserves are enough to last 55 years. Moreover, the efforts continue in search of offshore oil in the Libyan territorial waters.

Libyan oil production has fluctuated from a peak production of 2.1 million barrels daily in 1979 to 1.1 million barrels daily in 1983. This is the quota allocated by OPEC for Libyan oil production. Oil reserves amounted to \$15.2 billion in 1979 and \$22.6 billion in 1980 but then dropped sharply to reach \$10 billion in 1983. As a result of this decline, great pressures have been exerted on government financing and this has created restrictions on the developments concerning projects scheduled to be set up in the petrochemicals sector, including a complex for the production of ethylene gas in Ra's Lanuf with an estimated production capacity of 33,000 tons annually.

In the oil refining sector, the oil refinery in Ra's Lanuf will be put into operation this year. This complex, with a daily production capacity of 220,000 barrels, is geared largely toward exportation. Libyan industry officials have been recently looking for outlets to export refined oil to Europe. This complex will bolster Libya's refining capacity which amounts at present to 140,000 barrels daily. The plans that were recently under discussion to raise Libya's oil refining capacity to 820,000 barrels daily have been shelved.

External Economy

The vast surplus in the Libyan balance of trade in the 1977-80 period, when this surplus amounted to \$8.2 billion, was the yardstick. This surplus was the result of an average increase of 70 percent in oil prices in that period, with the price exceeding \$36 per barrel.

In 1981, a number of factors caused the Libyan current account to experience a deficit for the first time throughout an entire decade. Those factors included the decline of oil revenues by 30 percent, an increase of nearly \$3 billion in the exports list and the sharp increase experienced by the remittances.

In 1982, the current account showed some improvement in the wake of major efforts exerted by the government to contain local spending, especially in the consumer goods sector. In 1983, imports were also curtailed. This tendency is expected to continue as long as the opportunity for increasing oil exports remains uncertain.

International Reserves

The gold and foreign currency reserves dropped to nearly \$7 billion by the end of October 1983, compared to \$8.3 billion at the end of 1982, because reserves were used to finance the deficit in the current account, estimated at \$2 billion at the end of 1983. At the end of 1980, the reserves had amounted to \$13.1 billion.

Whereas Libya has never needed to resort to the world money markets, problems of cash flow did emerge in 1982 and the payment of installments due for commercial loans from French, Spanish and Italian banks was delayed. Moreover, Turkish contracting companies and textile mills were hurt severely because of delayed payments. Arrangements were made to pay the installments for these loans on the basis of oil bartering operations. Oil production rose in the second half of 1982 and the price of oil was reduced to increase sales and pay the sums owed for loan installments.

Future Prospects

1. Even though Libya is the sixth biggest oil producer in the OPEC, the sharp decline in oil production and in oil revenues may cause the real economic growth rate to stay at 2-3 percent in 1984.
2. The severe cash shortage has resulted in the accumulation of foreign debts, estimated by market sources at \$2 billion owed in late installments to contractors and [foreign] exporters but not resulting from foreign borrowing. This is why Libya has gained the reputation of being a "tardy payer" of debts, considering that it delays payments due for new commitments while paying for older claims.
3. The reduced investments will curtail the growth in the non-economic sector for which future expectations had projected a growth rate of more than 9 percent annually during the 1981-85 5-year plan.
4. The continued watch over and control of consumer commodity imports must mean achieving some equilibrium in the balance of payments in the near future. Despite this, this equilibrium may be limited because of increased military spending.

5. In the medium range, and should the demand for oil be revived in the next few years, the pressure on the Libyan economy will diminish. The transformation to oil by-products will increase export revenues. If imports are controlled and reduced, it will be possible to achieve a surplus in the balance of payments and a surplus will then inevitably be available for the development projects that have been suspended or delayed.

The high growth rates experienced by the Libyan economy in the late 1970's are something of the past. However, the expansion in the agricultural and industrial sectors will inevitably produce growth in the economy.

6. If we take into consideration the accessible oil reserves and the narrow population base in Libya, in addition to the local market, then the achievement of economic growth seems certain. Moreover, any difficulties pertaining to liquidity must inevitably be relatively short-lived.

Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

(Figures in #1 Million) [as published]

	1979	1980	1981	Estimated 1982	Estimated 1983
Gross Local Product	2.65	3.52	3.030	3.450	-
Actual Growth (%)	45.7	18.3	(23.2)	3.0	2.0
Average Individual Income (dollars)	9.268	11.865	9.785	10.727	-
Population	2.26	2.97	3.10	3.22	3.35
Average Exchange Price	2.564	2.648	2.902	3.06	3.378
Foreign Currency Reserve	6.344	13.091	9.003	7.059	5.594
Ratio of Reserves to Total Imports (Month)					7.6
Exports	15.981	21.919	14.731	14.100	
Imports	8.938	10.891	14.025	12.000	
Balance of Trade	7.043	11.028	706	2.100	
Current Account Balance	4.023	8.239	(2.977) (2.400)		(2.000)
Capital and Official Remittances	(414)	(668)	(1,397) (1,500)		
Oil Production (1,000 Barrels Daily)	2.092	1.830	1.217	1.144	1.065
Oil Revenues	15.223	22.600	15.600	14.000	10.000
Retail Price Indicators	(5.6)	12.0	15.0	17.0	17.0

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MOROCCO

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS FOR 1983-84 EXAMINED

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 10 Apr 84 p 13

[Article: "AL-QABAS Reviews Horizons of Arab Economy in 1983-84; Kingdom of Morocco: Sahara War Interacts and Brings with It Socioeconomic Burdens"]

[Text] Morocco is currently undergoing a difficult phase brimming with local economic problems, internal turmoil and enormous burdens emanating from foreign debts and, finally, from the ongoing war in the Western Sahara.

The economic hardships faced by Morocco in 1982-83 have continued in 1984. Morocco's main exports, namely phosphate and its derivatives, are facing an extremely stagnant world market. Moreover, the devaluation of the Moroccan dirham vis-a-vis the dollar has led to increasing the cost of imports paid for by the dollar, such as crude oil, sulfur and grains. As a result of the stagnation, it has also become difficult to storm the foreign markets, not to mention the fact that major foreign investors refrain from investing in Morocco.

The Moroccan gross national product rose by 3-4 percent in 1982-83 in the wake of the decline it experienced in 1981. What is regrettable is that economic growth was partially responsible for the deterioration experienced by current accounts and the balance of trade, with this deterioration leading to intensified burdens represented by foreign debts. As for inflation, it amounted to 12 percent in the past 2 years.

Government Development Plan

The Moroccan 5-year (1981-85) development plan calls for achieving an annual increase of 6.5 percent in the total national product and for creating 900,000 jobs annually. But the developmental performance fell far too short of the objectives targeted by the plan for 1981. Even though the gross national product rose by 4 percent in 1982, the financial difficulties and obstacles gave the impression that not all the projects that had been planned would get the necessary financing.

The plan dealt with six priority sectors, namely agriculture, fishing, energy, mining, tourism and industry. The plan calls for constant growth in grain, vegetable oils, olives, vegetable, fruit and livestock production.

With the establishment of a free economic zone with an area of 200 square miles and with the creation of a new ministry for fishing on the high seas in 1981, the Moroccan government is demonstrating a big interest in developing the enormous fish resources that have not been fully tapped yet. At present, the World Bank is conducting a study that will cover all of Morocco's needs for advanced fishing boats and refrigeration units.

Because of the enormous size of its oil imports, the Moroccan government is exerting maximum efforts to develop the country's natural energy resources. Three major U.S. firms have concluded contracts with the Moroccan Hydrocarbons Bureau for prospecting concessions in Moroccan coastal waters. Thanks to a loan from the World Bank valued at \$50 million, Morocco has been able to carry out oil and gas prospecting operations. A loan agreement for \$75 million has also been concluded with the World Bank to prospect for energy resources.

The Moroccan 5-year plan also calls for building six huge dams to generate electricity from water resources, in addition to meeting irrigation needs. The plan allocates a sum of \$883 million for the dams. It is also expected that Morocco will be able to build a nuclear power plant in the 1990's to utilize the uranium resources available in the country.

Tourism is also considered one of the main industries in Morocco. More than 1 million tourists visited the country in 1981, and the next years of the plan will witness a large-scale expansion in the sphere of tourist hotels.

The 5-year plan also underlines a major role for the private sector and its institutions in financing 76.4 billion dirhams out of the total financing needed for the plan, which is estimated to be 111 billion dirhams. The new regulations concerning the industrial sector make it possible for foreigners to participate in most industrial investments by up to 100 percent. These regulations include additional incentives in the form of tax exemptions, reduced customs fees, low-cost loans and subsidies for the purchase of land for the purpose of investment.

In addition to the primary sectors already noted, the mining and mineral industries sector continues to be of major importance. Moreover, the Moroccan Phosphate Bureau is in the process of implementing a 5-year expansion program at a cost of 25 billion Moroccan dirhams (\$4 billion). This program seeks to increase the annual mining capacity from 20.8 million tons to 30 million tons at the onset of 1985, in addition to building three plants for phosphate derivatives. It is likely that the recession being experienced by the phosphate markets at present will slow down these projects.

Balance of Payments

The trade deficit did diminish in the first half of 1983. However, it is not certain if this trend will continue. Some of the main reasons for this improvement achieved from January to June 1983 include the foodstuffs sector which realized a surplus of 100 billion Moroccan dirhams (\$12.8 million), compared to a deficit of 670 million dirhams (\$84.9 million) in the first 6 months of 1982. The initial estimates show that there was a sharp decline in agricultural

production in the second half of 1983, including grain production which declined by 30 percent. This may lead to more food commodity imports. In the first half of 1983, total exports rose by 16 percent and imports dropped by 8 percent. As a result, the deficit gap was narrowed by 27 percent, with the deficit reduced to 5.214 billion Moroccan dirhams (\$661 million). Foreign sales of food, drink and tobacco rose by 19.1 percent. The sale of semi-processed goods also rose by 36 percent. As a result of the restrictions imposed in March 1981, raw material imports dropped by 12 percent while imports of energy products dropped by 7 percent.

Information published recently shows that even though the trade deficit has begun to diminish, this deficit is still big by a troublesome degree. In the period from January to August 1983, the deficit dropped by 25 percent in comparison to the corresponding period of 1982 and reached 7.394 billion dirhams (\$924 million). Exports rose by 14.3 percent to reach 8.565 billion dirhams (\$1.07 billions), with the increase resulting from a growth of 15.3 percent in the sales of phosphate and its derivatives.

As for the imports, they dropped by 8.5 percent as a result of the trade restrictions to reach 15.959 billion dirhams (\$1.994 billion). The bill for purchases of the main commodity, namely crude oil, dropped by 9.8 percent to reach 3.94 billion dirhams (\$492 million).

In October 1983, Morocco obtained aid amounting to \$535 million for the balance of payments when 11 countries advancing loans to Morocco agreed to give the country this sum out of the total loan it had requested, amounting to \$600-700 million. With the continued deficit in the Moroccan balance of payments expected to amount to \$1.2 billion, and with the lack of the chance to reduce this deficit rapidly in 1984, the problems of international liquidity will persist.

As for international liquidity, which is measured by foreign currency reserves, the IMF has estimated to be \$218 million in December 1982, a figure that is a little less than the \$230 million estimated for December 1981. However, these reserves dropped to \$59 million by the onset of September 1983.

Foreign Debts

Morocco's total medium- and short-term loans amount to \$13 billion, including \$4 billion in trade debts and \$6 billion in loans contracted with foreign countries. On top of this, Morocco obtained loans from the IMF, the World Bank and Arab countries.

At the end of January 1984, the rescheduling of the debts owed to the commercial banks was delayed due to disagreement over whether the Central Bank of Morocco is to take part in signing the final agreement. There was agreement in principle on the original debts that were due to be paid in the final 4 months of 1983 and on 90 percent of the sums due payment in 1984.

This agreement could cover a sum of \$530 million out of the total Moroccan obligations, a sum which carries an interest rate that is 1.75 percent above the interest rates prevalent among London's banks. The steering committee

of the 10 lending banks demanded inclusion of the Central Bank of Morocco as a party to the agreement to provide more guarantees. Rabat is still rejecting the banks' demand as a demand that violates and undermines the country's sovereignty. However, it is expected that a settlement of this issue will be reached shortly.

When the arrangements with the commercial banks are completed, they will constitute the final step toward securing the monies needed by Morocco in 1984. The efforts made so far have achieved considerable success. Last October, the lending Western countries rescheduled the debts payable by Morocco. Pledges of aid amounting to \$1.5 billion have also been obtained from the Paris Club, the IMF and another contributing country.

Future Prospects

1. It can be said that Morocco entered the "intensive care room" of the IMF in October 1980 when it received loans exceeding \$1 billion. The steps taken by the Moroccan policy recently have led to getting the approval of the IMF for continuing Morocco's negotiations with the lending banks to reschedule the Moroccan debts payable over the next 15 months. The steps taken in the economic policy include an increase of exports, a reduction of subsidies and a readiness to devalue the Moroccan dirham.
2. Morocco will still have to face years of austerity. This fact arouses the concern of the Moroccan authorities which watch the growing student riots (mostly in protest against economic conditions) with extreme anxiety. Continued subsidization of the food commodities will mean spending an additional \$300 million which have to be collected from the world markets or in higher taxes.
3. What further intensifies the country's economic hardships is the continued conflict in the Western Sahara, a former Spanish colony. This is because an intermittent war has settled in the area since the Spaniards left it in 1975-76. This area is of major strategic and economic importance because it contains large phosphate deposits.
4. In 1983, Morocco was able to meet the IMF demands by reducing the deficit in the balance of trade and the budget deficit pertaining to the gross national product. The latest estimates show that the deficit in the Moroccan balance of payments amounted to \$1.146 billion in 1983. This deficit is equal to 9 percent of the gross national product.

It is expected that this deficit will drop to \$840 million in 1984.

Kingdom of Morocco
(Figures in 1 Million Dollars)

	1979	1980	1981	1982 (estimated)	1983 (estimated)
Local Product at GDP					
Current Prices (K.D.)	15,911	17,789	14,984	14,920	-
Actual Growth (percent)	4.5	4.5	(2.2)	3.6	4.0
Average Individual					
Income (in dollars)	817	887	725	725	675
Population (in millions)	19.47	20.05	20.65	21.90	22.00
Average Exchange Rate					
(dollar/dinar)	3.738	4.334	5.333	6.267	7.856
Foreign Currency					
Reserves (millions of dirhams [K.D.])	557	399	230	218	59
Ratio of Reserves to					
Total Imports	2.0	1.7	1.0	1.0	1.0
Imports Reserve					
(millions K.D.)	3,245	3,770	3,840	4,300	-
Exports Reserve					
(millions K.D.)	1,937	2,414	2,283	2,200	-
Balance of Trade					
(millions K.D.)	(1,308)	(1,356)	(1,557)	(2,100)	-
Balance of Current					
Account (millions K.D.)	(1,520)	(1,420)	(1,843)	(1,907)	(1,150)
Capital and Official					
Remittances	934	1,117	1,087	1,400	1,200
Oil Production					
(1 million barrels a day)	-	-	-	-	-
Foreign Currency					
Revenues	3,646	4,387	4,171	3,947	3,875
Retail Price					
Indicator	8.3	9.4	12.5	10.6	12.0
Change in Money Supply	13.9	10.8	16.4	18.0	16.0
Foreign Debts	8,519	9,156	10,678	11,000	13,000
Servicing Foreign Debt	798	1,191	1,223	1,385	1,482
Ratio of Debt Servicing					
to Revenues	23	32	39	40	40

8494
CSO: 4504/253

TUNISIA

BRIEFS

NEW NEWSPAPER--The first issue of the new Arabic-language newspaper AL-AKHBAR appeared on Saturday, 14 April. Belonging to the Tunis-Hebdo group, the new newspaper's motto is: Quest for truth. [Summary] [LD220257 Tunis TAP in English 1000 GMT 16 Apr 84]

CSO: 4500/62

IRAQ REMAINS SUSPICIOUS OF U.S. INTENTIONS IN GULF

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 370, 27 Mar 84 p 29

[Article by Sulayman Nimr: "Iraq Threatens to End It"]

[Text] In an interview with AL-MUSTAQBAL, last week, Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Tariq al-'Azia said: "Iraq has plans that can guarantee the termination of the conflict militarily in a way that will put an end to the Iranian aggression against Iraq." This statement was confirmed to us by Maj Gen Mahir 'Abd-al-Rashid, commander of the Iraqi Third Army, during our meeting with him at the Iraqi-Iranian front east of al-Basrah.

Anyone who sees conditions on the Iraqi front and the morale of the Iraqi troops--we were told that the Iraqi Army has placed a piece of heavy artillery every 150 meters all along the front--can assert definitely that the Iraqi military situation is good enough that Iraq is still capable of achieving military victories.

However, while Iraq may possess the potential to conclude its conflict with Iran militarily, is it capable of realizing this potential? And can such a conclusion end the war, which Iraq truly wishes to end in a way that will preserve its honor and eliminate the possibility of a rekindling of problems in the future?

These are the questions that are now current among political circles--particularly in diplomatic circles in the Iraqi capital.

That which can be understood of current events in Iraq indicates that Iraq is arranging its affairs militarily, internally, and even politically for a conclusion. Iraq's military position is good--according to our perception on the front--and there are large quantities of arms that have not yet been used by the Iraqi Army, as we were told by an Arab ambassador in Baghdad. These include Soviet surface-to-surface missiles, French Mirage 2000 and Super Etandard aircraft, and Exocet missiles. According to remarks made by Maj Gen Mahir 'Abd-al-Rashid, with whom we and other journalists met east of al-Basrah last Saturday, the Iraqi Army is impatiently awaiting orders from its political command to bring the conflict to an end. Major General 'Abd-al-Rashid said: "I can positively state that we are capable of thwarting the attacks of the Iranian enemy and we will show them no mercy in this war of

ours because we have adopted the slogan 'Exterminate the enemy, do not just repel his attacks!' We will use all the weapons we have available to repel any new Iranian attack. And we will not repel him only on the battle field but anywhere we can reach him deep in Iranian territory, whether in Teheran or the city of Mashad." When we asked him about Kharj Island, he also responded with resolution: "Why should we make Kharj Island an exception? We will no longer be polite at the expense of our interests." When the Iraqi military commander stated that he would employ all weapons available to him, the foreign journalists asked questions about chemical weapons. Major General 'Abd-al-Rashid asserted that he had never used chemical weapons at all and swore that he had never seen them. He said that the decision to use chemical weapons is a political decision.

Turning to internal conditions in Iraq, are preparations being made to prepare the internal front for a decisive battle?

We observed that life in the Iraqi capital is still normal. Even the night clubs open their doors until the early morning hours and nothing appears unusual. The Iraqi citizen has begun to receive the news of the death of a brother or son in the fighting as a natural occurrence because this citizen has now begun to believe that he has no choice but to fight since it is confirmed each day that Iran has political and geographical ambitions in Iraq. Diplomatic information says that "certain preparations" have begun in some Iraqi cities for a battle that could force Iran to undertake some suicidal raids. For instance, in the suburbs of Baghdad where some military installations are located, the possibility of relocating the residents of these suburbs to other, safer places in case of exposure to any threats has begun to be explored.

But will Iraqi, Arab, and international political circumstances permit a military conclusion?

First of all, it must be said that the complexity of Arab and international political conditions and equations makes it difficult for Iraq to make its political decision to end the fighting and stop this war that is really exhausting it. In spite of its good military position, there is no doubt that ending the fighting requires positive international political conditions. Ending the fighting does not mean ending it in the practical sense. It may well mean threatening to end it in order to convince the other side to accept a conclusion of the war and enter into negotiations to end the conflict. This is what Iraq wants, as observers here in Baghdad agree. The Iraqi call for an emergency conference of the Arab foreign ministers came as part of the Iraqi move now underway to prepare Arab and international political conditions for an end to the war with Iran in the wake of Iraq's loss of hope that Iran would accept any mediation to end the war. In the emergency conference of Arab foreign ministers that met in Baghdad last Wednesday, Iraq was able to win a unified Arab position supporting its positions. The Arab ministers confirmed their commitment to the Fez summit conference resolution, which expresses "solidarity with Iraq in its legitimate effort to repel the aggression and warning Iran against continuing its war against Iraq, which is a member

of the Arab League." There is no doubt that the five resolutions issued by the conference of Arab foreign ministers were a big political victory for Iraq despite the fact that the Iraqi foreign ministers endeavored to convince the conference that the war Iraq is waging is an Arab-Iranian war, not just an Iraqi-Iranian war.

Some observers are not optimistic about these resolutions. They say they will remain mere "ink on paper," even though these resolutions included the formation of a committee of foreign ministers to monitor the practical implementation of the resolutions. Represented on this committee are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, North Yemen, Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco and the General Secretariat of the Arab League, in addition to Iraq. These pessimists said: What can the Arab people do for Iraq in its effort to end the war, especially since the Iraqis do not ask for military or material support?

However, an Iraqi official said to AL-MUSTAQBAL: "It is political and moral support that Iraq wants from the Arab states. On the basis of the fact that the application of the resolutions of the Baghdad emergency conference can really help Iraq end this war, the unified Arab position on the war will create political pressures on the superpowers--particularly the United States--to intervene to stop the war."

According to our perceptions in Baghdad, the Iraqis feel that it is the United States that benefits from the continuation of the war. The Iraqis believe that Washington has an interest in maintaining the state of unrest in the Persian Gulf region and this is accomplished by the continuation of the war. It is felt in Baghdad that the hundreds of millions of dollars spent on weapons whether by Teheran or Baghdad benefit many of the Western companies--and American companies in particular. For this reason, the Arab states and the Gulf states in particular should take a position that threatens the interests of Washington and the Western states and will actually make them intervene and force Teheran to stop the war.

An Iraqi official explained this to AL-MUSTAQBAL: "Iraq knows that there are Japanese and European companies that are responsible for implementing numerous military and civilian projects and installations within Iran. If the Western states were able to put pressure on these companies, their projects in Iran would cease."

In addition to this, we observed in Baghdad that Soviet-Iraqi relations have begun to regain their vitality. The Iraqi information organizations have begun to focus attention on measures taken in the field of bilateral relations with Moscow. In addition to the new Iraqi attention to the visit of Soviet Communist Party Central Committee Member Yakov Ryabov, chairman of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations in the Soviet Council of Ministers, the Iraqi newspaper AL-THAWRAH published on the front page of its edition of last Monday the text of a Soviet congratulatory telegram to President Saddam Husayn on the anniversary of the technical cooperation and friendship agreement between Moscow and Baghdad. More importantly, the Iraqi Government is no longer opposing the return of the Iraqi Communist Party to its activities

within the framework of the National Front led by the ruling Ba'th Party.

Observers in Baghdad say that the Soviet-Iraqi rapprochement may be one of the reasons behind the American campaign against Iraq that is being waged these days.

8591

CSO: 4404/413

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION HELPS TO SUPPLY ENERGY NEEDS

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG/BLICK DURCH DIE WIRTSCHAFT in German 4 Apr 84
p 2

[Text] The expansion of the energy supply was pushed recently in Jordan in an effort to keep up with the rapidly growing energy consumption volume. Electric energy consumption in 1982 rose to 1,387.2 million kwh, in other words, 18.1 percent more than in 1981. During the first 8 months of 1983, it continued to rise to 1,110.8 million kwh and was thus about 20 percent higher than during the same period of time last year. The new projects in particular involve the construction of a thermoelectric power plant in the port city of Aqaba, the expansion of the thermoelectric power plant in Zerqa, as well as the erection of a smaller power plant in the southern part of Amman, the capital. This is connected with the construction of high-voltage power lines and the development of distribution networks in cities as well as the electrification of rural areas.

The most important project of JEA (Jordan Electricity Authority) is the erection of the first expansion phase of the thermoelectric power plant which is located 19 km south of Aqaba on the coast and which can use sea water for cooling. This power plant will initially be equipped with two blocks with an installed capacity 130 Mw, each. The commissioning of the first phase is scheduled for the second half of 1986. Two additional blocks (300 Mw, each) are planned for the second construction phase until 1990 and another two blocks (300 Mw, each) are to follow by the year 2000. After the first stage has been placed in operation, the country's total power generating capacity will go up to 825.5 Mw. In 1976, it was only 130 Mw.

Orders worth around 72 million Jordan Dinars (1 Jordan Dinar is equivalent to about DM7.10) have already been awarded for the erection of the first expansion phase for the thermoelectric power plant at Aqaba. The Italian firm of Franco Tosi was awarded the contracts for the delivery and installation of turbines and generators worth 28.7 million Jordan Dinars. Mitsubishi Corporation and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, two Japanese enterprises, accepted a contract for the boiler system worth 19.6 million Jordan Dinars. The Japanese consortium of Mitsubishi-Fudo is to do the construction work worth 19.5 million Jordan Dinars. The contract for the circuit system (2.8 million Jordan Dinars) went to Brown, Boveri and Cie. AG [Incorporated] (BBC), Mannheim, and the contract for the oil tanks (1.3 million Jordan Dinars) went to the South Korean firm of Sam Song. The American enterprise of Charles T. Main, Boston, Massachusetts, was chosen as the consultant enterprise. The British enterprise of Balfour Beatty, Ltd., Thornton Heat (Surrey), which belongs to the BICC Group in

October 1983 got an order worth 19 million Pounds Sterling for the construction of a 322-km long 400-kv twin overhead power line which will connect the thermo-electric power plant at Aqaba with Amman and the thermoelectric power plant at Zerqa. Around 18,000 t of steel structures are needed and they will be delivered by the British firm of Painter Brothers, Hereford, which likewise belongs to the BICC Group. The Austrian firm of VMW (United Metal Works Ranshofen-Berndorf, Incorporated), at Ranshofen in Upper Austria, got the order for the delivery of the necessary cables (worth 5.0 million Jordan Dinars) and the Japanese firm of C. Itoh and Company, Ltd. was given the contract for the insulators (1.9 million Jordan Dinars). The British firm of Preece [as published; Peerce] Cardew and Rider, Brighton, was given a consultant function in connection with the construction of the high-voltage power line.

JEA and the government of Jordan are participating with a total of 18 percent in financing the entire project (first phase of the thermoelectric power plant and high-voltage power line). Additional funds were procured via loans from the KFAED (Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development) with 10 million Jordan Dinars, the Islamic Development Bank with \$30 million, the OPEC Fund for International Development with \$10 million, the World Bank with \$35 million, and the Saudi Fund. Individual industrial nations, such as the FRG, Great Britain, and Italy also granted credit assistance. The remaining financing was obtained through supplier loans. The FRG which, back in 1977, had already authorized a loan of DM13.5 million for the electric power supply of Aqaba, at the end of April 1983 granted a loan of DM9.5 million. The British contribution was made through the banking establishment of J. Henry Schroder Wagg with support from the Department of Trade and Industry.

The Japanese enterprise of C. Itoh and Company Ltd. was given the contract to deliver, install, and start the eighth block (66 Mw) for the King Hussein thermoelectric power plant in Zerqa in the spring of 1983; this is the country's most important energy source. Before that, four blocks of 33 Mw, each, and three blocks of 66 Mw, each, had been installed here. The value of the order has been given at 15 million Jordan Dinars. After completion of the expansion investment, which is scheduled for February 1985, the thermoelectric power plant will have an installed capacity of 396 Mw. With the commercial establishment of C. Itoh and Company Ltd. acting as general manager, the firms of Fuji Electric Company Kawasaki Heavy Industries Ltd., Konoike Construction Company, and Tokyo Electric Power Services Company were also involved in the project. Kuljian Corporation, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, of America, came in as the consultant enterprise for this project.

At the end of 1983 and the beginning of 1984, C. Itoh & Company Ltd. received a declaration of intention from JEA on the delivery and installation of a thermoelectric power plant with two gas turbines (36 Mw, each) which is to be built on the grounds of the transformer plant south of Amman. Hitachi Ltd., of Japan, has become involved in this project as subcontractor. The value of the order for C. Itoh and Company Ltd. comes to 4.5 million Jordan Dinars.

At the end of 1983 and the beginning of 1984, the World Bank granted Jordan a loan of \$30 million which is to be used above all for the expansion of the urban distribution networks of Jepco (Jordan Electric Power Company) and Ideco (Irbid District Electricity Company) as well as for the electrification of

75 villages in the government districts of Amman, Balka, and Irbid. Besides, petroleum exploration is to be promoted through the Natural Resources Authority. The entire investment expenditure for the program, which is being supported by the World Bank, has been estimated at \$68 million. The USAID and the UN Development Program and Italy will presumably also participate in the financing.

The Jordan Valley Authority, in Amman, is planning the construction of two smaller hydroelectric power plants. The first one, with an installed capacity of 1 Mw is to be erected at the end of the canal leading from Mukaibeh to the East Ghor Canal. The second one (300 kw) is to be built in North Shuneh on the Wadi-el-Arab dam. International advance bidding competition was started for both projects in the autumn of 1983. The FRG furthermore granted Jordan technical aid in the amount of DM3.2 million in 1981 for the support of the Royal Scientific Society in the field of renewable energy source utilization.

5058

CSO: 4620/28

KUWAIT

STATISTICS ON POPULATION, LABOR, WAGES CITED

Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 29 Mar 84 p 5

[Article: "Percentage of Kuwaitis to Total Population Has Risen to 42.5 Percent; Population Has Reached 1.52 Million People"]

[Text] By the end of April 1983, the percentage of native Kuwaitis to the total population rose to 42.56 percent, compared to 41.65 percent in April 1980.

The population was also estimated in April 1983 to be 1.52 million people, of whom 647,000 people are native Kuwaitis. These figures are contained in a statement made yesterday by Musa'id al-'Umaym, the assistant undersecretary for planning affairs at the Ministry of Planning, to the KUWAIT NEWS AGENCY on the new indicators and final results of the manpower sample survey. The assistant undersecretary said that the final outcome of the manpower sample survey produced estimates of the population at the time when the survey was conducted in April 1983 and estimates of the Kuwaiti vocational manpower structure for both Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis. The survey also produced data on the percentages of this manpower in the various vocations, the average period of work in each vocation, the educational levels, the residency periods, the workers' average weekly workhours and the workers' average monthly wages.

Al-'Umaym added that the Central Statistics Administration conducted this manpower survey by the sampling method from 3 April to 18 May 1983.

The assistant undersecretary said that the number of families surveyed was 5,374 families, including 2,033 Kuwaiti families. The survey also included 3,882 non-Kuwaitis living in 442 collective homes. The number of individuals included in the survey totaled nearly 41,000 people living in more than 50 population centers.

The assistant undersecretary cited some of the results reached, saying that the survey, conducted in April 1983, made it possible to estimate the population at nearly 1.52 million people, including 647,000 Kuwaitis. This means a tangible improvement in the percentage of the Kuwaitis to the total population, with this percentage amounting to 42.56 percent in April 1980 [presumably meaning 1983]. This improvement is expected to continue in future years, considering that the annual growth rate of newcomers in the 1980-83 period

came to 3.276 percent whereas this percentage was 8.67 percent in the 1975-80 period. The labor force has been estimated to be 498,000 persons or 32.7 percent of the total population.

He said that the vocational structure of the Kuwaitis indicates a considerable improvement in the number of people in technical, scientific and similar vocations. In April 1983, these people represented 20 percent of the Kuwaiti labor force whereas this percentage was 15.6 percent in 1980. There has also been considerable improvement in the percentage of Kuwaiti administrators and business managers in the workforce, with this percentage rising from just 2.1 percent in 1980 to 5.3 percent in April 1983. This means that there is an evident tendency among Kuwaitis to embark on technical and scientific vocations and on project management, having gained an abundant share of education and knowledge and having benefited from the experience and training made available in numerous spheres.

The assistant undersecretary said that the vocational structure of the non-Kuwaitis did not change much during the 1980-83 period, except for production and ordinary workers who represented 44.8 percent of the incoming manpower in 1980 but dropped to 39.6 percent in 1983. This is an inevitable outcome, considering that many of these workers had to leave the country because of illegal residency or because the work they had been engaged in was completed.

The average period for which Kuwaiti workers generally engage in a vocation is 8.3 years, compared to 8.9 years for the non-Kuwaitis. As for those who come into the country with technical and scientific skills, they engage in their professions for nearly 10 years, compared to 6 years for Kuwaitis engaged in the same professions.

He added that 76.8 percent of the Kuwaiti labor force is engaged in activities connected with social and personal services, compared to 43.5 percent of the incoming manpower. A total of 7.6 percent of the Kuwaiti labor force is engaged in transportation, storage and communications activities, compared to 6.1 percent for non-Kuwaiti manpower. Activities pertaining to wholesale and retail merchandising, restaurants and hotels absorb 3.9 percent of the Kuwaiti labor force, compared to 13.3 percent for non-Kuwaiti manpower. As for building and construction activities, it is almost confined to non-Kuwaiti manpower, absorbing 21.5 percent of this manpower and a meager 0.9 percent of Kuwaiti manpower. This activity absorbed 25.2 percent of the non-Kuwaiti manpower in 1980. The reasons for the drop of this percentage to 21.2 percent in 1983 is the departure of many of the workers who had been employed in this activity in the country. Nearly 26 percent of the non-Kuwaiti manpower is illiterate, and only 24 percent of this group can both read and write. The average period these workers stay in Kuwait is 7 years. A total of 17.2 percent of non-Kuwaiti manpower has less than a high school education and the average period of this group's stay in Kuwait is nearly 18 years. As for the non-Kuwaiti workers with a high school education or with higher qualifications, they constitute 13.6 percent of non-Kuwaiti manpower and their average stay is 12.4 years. University graduates and workers with higher qualifications constitute 13.8 percent of non-Kuwaiti manpower and their average stay in the country is 10.3 years.

He added that the stay period of non-Kuwaiti labor differs according to profession. The average stay period of people in the technical and scientific professions and of agricultural workers in Kuwait is close to 11 years. As for executive managers and clerks, they stay in Kuwait for a period ranging from 12.7 to 14 years. Sales and production workers stay in the country for 9 years on the average whereas those employed in services stay an average of 6.7 years.

He said further that the stay period of non-Kuwaiti manpower differs according to the activity in which it is employed. The average stay of non-Kuwait workers employed in mines, quarries, electricity, gas, water, transportation and storage activities ranges from 11.5 to 13.5 years. As for those employed in financing, insurance and real estate activities and in business services, public services and social and personal services, their average period of stay is 9.5 years. Workers employed in building, construction and conversion industries stay in the country an average of 7.6 to 8.7 years.

The assistant undersecretary also noted that the average work week for Kuwaiti workers is 40 hours, compared to 48 hours for newcomers. However, the average work week varies from activity to activity. The average work week for both Kuwaiti and non-Kuwaiti labor engaged in sales activity is 50 hours. The average for labor engaged in agricultural and related activities is 47 hours a week for both Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis. Kuwaitis engaged in service activities work an average of 44 hours a week, which rise to 52 hours a week for foreign labor. Kuwaiti executive managers and business managers work an average of 40 hours a week whereas non-Kuwaitis work an average of 45 hours a week. Kuwaiti clerks work an average of 35 hours a week, while the figure rises to 40 hours a week for non-Kuwaiti clerks. The average work week differs from one economic activity to another. For those engaged in trade, hotel, building, construction and agricultural activity, the average is 46-54 hours a week and there is no significant difference between Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis. For those working in mining, financing, insurance, real estate and service activities, the average is 42 hours a week for both Kuwaiti and non-Kuwaiti labor. As for the other economic activities, the average is 45 hours for foreigners, a figure which diminishes to 48 [as published] hours for Kuwaitis.

The average monthly income of the Kuwaiti worker generally is 410 dinars and for the non-Kuwaiti 239 dinars. The people earning the highest wages are executive managers and business managers who earn an average monthly salary of 908 dinars for Kuwaitis and 778 dinars for non-Kuwaitis.

Al-'Umaym added that the group earning the next highest wages is the group of people with technical and scientific skills who earn an average monthly wage of 456 dinars for Kuwaitis and 412 dinars for non-Kuwaitis. Sales workers come in third place, with average monthly wages of 440 dinars for Kuwaitis and 300 dinars for non-Kuwaitis. The average monthly wages for clerks are 373 dinars for Kuwaitis and 263 for non-Kuwaitis. Production workers and workers in related activities, workers operating means of transportation and ordinary workers, most of whom are non-Kuwaitis, earn an average monthly wage of 405 dinars for Kuwaitis and 326 dinars for non-Kuwaitis.

As for workers engaged in services, the average monthly wage for the Kuwaiti is 388 dinars, which drops to 81 dinars a month for the non-Kuwaitis. The reason for this is that a large number of these workers are employed as domestics at an average monthly salary of 34 dinars.

The average wage also varies according to the different economic activities. We find that Kuwaitis engaged in the building and construction activity, amounting to no more than 0.9 percent of the Kuwaiti labor force, earn average monthly wages of 989 dinars, compared to 389 dinars for non-Kuwaitis. It is well known that the majority of the non-Kuwaitis engaged in this activity are craftsmen and constitute 21.2 percent of the workforce. As for those working in mines and quarries, the average monthly wages are 534 dinars for Kuwaitis and 455 dinars for non-Kuwaitis. The two averages are close to each other. Regarding workers in the conversion industries, their average monthly wage is 533 dinars for Kuwaitis and 236 dinars for non-Kuwaitis. The equivalent of 9.7 percent of non-Kuwaitis labor is employed in this sphere. As for those working in commerce, hotels and restaurants, their average monthly wage is 422 dinars for Kuwaitis and 251 dinars for non-Kuwaitis.

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KUWAIT

DIFFERING VIEWS ON FREEDOM OF PRESS CITED

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 3 Apr 84 p 9

[Article by Nayif al-Rukaybi: "Press Chief Editors Answer Question: Does Our Press Actually Reflect Public Opinion"]

[Text] As part of the activity of the second Shari'a week, organized by the Cultural Committee of the Shari'a Association at Kuwait University, a symposium was held at 1830 2 days ago under the title of "Our Press: Does It Actually Reflect People's Opinion?" Colleague Jasim al-Mutawwi', the chief editor of AL-WATAN; Ahmad al-Jarallah, the chief editor of the sisterly newspaper AL-SIYASAH; colleague Isma'il al-Shatti, the chief editor of AL-MUJTAMA' magazine; and Wa'il al-Hasawi, a university instructor, spoke at the symposium.

Maturity of Kuwaiti Press

Colleague Jasim al-Mutawwi', the chief editor of AL-WATAN, was the first to address the symposium, saying that the Kuwaiti press, regardless of the negative features it contains, has attained at a rapid pace a degree of maturity and development unmatched by similar Arab periodicals. He said that the Kuwaiti press is not just important but also envied in the Arab countries and that there are those, be they individuals or groups, who wish to curb it because of the opinion it reflects, the widespread circulation it enjoys or the public opinion it forms in this country.

If the Kuwaiti press were to be transferred to another Arab country, it would not be published as it is now published in Kuwait because of the climate of freedom, it has enabled this press to play this effective and leading role, despite its shortcomings and despite some problems experienced by the press apparatus.

Paper's Tasks

Colleague al-Mutawwi' also spoke of a newspaper's tasks generally, saying that a paper transmits information and news to familiarize public opinion with what is happening around it, whether in its small society or in human society generally. This information has come to represent a sort of rapid daily education of the reader so that he may develop his convictions and concepts on numerous issues through what he reads daily. This is what has

enabled the press to overtake books, with daily education coming through the press and profound education coming through the books. Regarding the second task of the press, the colleague lecturer said that the press engages in opinion making either by transmitting the journalist's tendencies to the public or by transmitting the public's tendencies to the decision makers in society. He said that reflecting the people's opinion is one of the main tasks of a paper because a paper provides the opportunity to the people, who do not take part in decisionmaking and who do not get the opportunity to express their opinion elsewhere, to have a podium. It is a daily, continuous and direct podium. He added that through the expression and interaction of opinions, public's tendencies and inclinations become known. It is essential that the ruling authority, be it a cabinet or a parliament, be familiarized with the opinions published in the press, whether they are the opinions of writers, journalists or readers representing positive pressure on the executive agencies.

Special Characteristic of Kuwait

Regarding the special characteristic of Kuwait, the colleague lecturer said that where political organizations and parties are absent, the task of the press grows bigger because the press becomes the main channel through which opinions interact and viewpoints crystallize. The press is an instrument to reflect the people's pains, hopes and aspirations and to present them to the officials. It is also an instrument to transmit the officials' viewpoints to the people. This means that in the absence of a partisan political organization, the task of the press becomes bigger. He said that if we add the special characteristic of the phase now going on in Kuwait as a young state and add the pioneer role being played by the Kuwaiti press, especially in the past 10 years, we would find that this press has become the model truly reflecting the people and that it has become fundamentally influential at the level of the entire Gulf, and even within the broader Arab sphere. The Kuwaiti press may have perhaps been given two opportunities at the same time, namely:

The opportunity of technological progress and modern equipment.

The opportunity of belief of freedom and democracy, which write the sentence of life or death for the press.

Colleague al-Mutawwi' added that the press situation varies from society to society. The question asked amidst this variance is: Whose press is this press? Is it the state press, a party's press or the press of whomever is able to publish a paper?

Papers differ insofar as subject matter and news reports are concerned, considering that the news report is the central point in journalistic subject matter. Publication of the news report constitutes a criterion that reveals the quality of the press. The first kind of press is the press that is committed to the news report, regardless of what or whom the report is about. This press disregards what negative results the report may produce. This is the press of provocation and scandals and its objective is profit. Its reader may become a mere buyer and consumer and this press does not reflect the people's opinion.

The second kind of press is the press that believes that the news report serves a purpose, produces either a negative or a positive yield to society and contributes to developing society and to enhancing people's awareness.

The lecturer added that if a paper wants to reflect public opinion, then what is required of it is to act as the compass that indicates the direction of events and the points around which the events center. This role is embodied in linking incidents and events with each other and anticipating their future features and directions.

He said that the observer of the Kuwaiti press finds a vast space for editorials, whether in special editorial pages or in those corners set aside for short articles and found in all papers. I would add to this another thing, namely biting criticism summed up in a few lines. There is a wide space for the readers' opinions as well. If we examine the percentage of press space filled with what the readers write in the Kuwaiti papers in comparison with the space they fill in the Arab papers, or even in the Western press, we would find that the percentage in our country is high. This is tantamount to pride in the reader and to holding the reader in high esteem.

The colleague lecturer added that the press does not disregard any enlightened opinion, "perhaps even unenlightened opinion," in this country. All opinions and all tendencies are published. A paper may be partial to a certain opinion. This is normal because every paper has its tendency and a message in which it believes. But under the canopy of this tendency, the counteropinion is not impounded and the opportunity is usually given to the opinion and the counteropinion without any partiality.

Colleague Jasim al-Mutawwi' further said that if we moved from discussing the course followed by our Kuwaiti press to discussing its content, we would ask: To what degree does this content reflect the people. If we examine a number of examples, we would find that the reflection is undoubtedly present.

The issue of the amendment to the constitution, the issue of naturalization, the issue of al-Manakh Market, the issue of women and of their political role and the issue of the explosions have reflected consensus on standing against sabotage and for safeguarding Kuwait's security. In all these issues, the press has been committed to reflecting public opinion and the various currents have found the means to express their opinion.

The colleague lecturer added that there are some reasons that make us reserved to say that the local press fully reflects the people's opinion. These are subjective and objective reasons, namely that the freedom given the press is not enough to reflect the people's viewpoint frankly and explicitly and that the press is owned by certain groups in society that cannot overlook their interests completely.

Most of the cadres working the the local press are not native cadres and this redoubles their fear of raising certain issues directly.

The press does not operate in a vacuum. Consequently, it is restricted within certain limits to avoid confrontation with the government. This is done by lessening the intensity with which some issues are presented to make the presentation compatible with the broad lines of state policy.

The press's reliance on advertisements curtails its tackling of certain issues, especially consumer affairs, lest a paper lose a source of revenue important for its continuation.

Al-Jarallah Expresses Satisfaction with al-Mutawwi' Statements

The symposium moderator then introduced colleague Ahmad al-Jarallah, the chief editor of AL-SIYASAH, who expressed satisfaction with what colleague Jasim al-Mutawwi' had said, considering that al-Mutawwi' had dealt with numerous aspects of the issue. This was a contribution [sacrifice] on the part of al-Jarallah who was concerned with the symposium time and with the numerous people scheduled to speak. However, al-Jarallah expressed his readiness to answer any questions from the audience.

Wa'il al-Hasawi, an instructor at the university, then delivered an address which he opened by saying that in a country like Kuwait, blessed by God with stability and security, the press is supposed to be the main representative of the people's opinions and aspirations and to solve their problems and concerns. But this has not happened. Al-Hasawi added that most of the press owners have covered their eyes with a thick blindfold so that they may not see the people's concerns and they have come up with different solutions for the people's problems. The lecturer cited as an example the press' position toward the phenomenon of religious piety or of the Islamic awakening, saying that the press has taken a strange position and has viewed this phenomenon as an abnormality in society. The press has taken a negative position toward the phenomenon of piety and has stood against, ridiculed and attacked the religious youth.

He further said that both the Western and the Eastern media have viewed the religious phenomenon objectively and have not ridiculed it, contrary to our local press. What is more, our papers have reached the limit of casting doubts on and attacking God's doctrines through poems and fabricated stories about the prophets. On top of all this, nobody has been able to answer these writers because those proposing to answer have been muzzled.

As another example, al-Hasawi cited the media's position toward amending the second article of the constitution, saying that 94 percent of the people's representatives submitted this proposal. Some people interpreted their initiative as an initiative intended for other ends that please their voters. The press has taken a negative stance toward this issue and has banned articles supporting the amending of the second article of the constitution. He said that if the press reflected the people's opinion, it would stand with the supporters of the amendment because amending this article is a popular demand. The press could also conduct a popular referendum. For a third example, al-Hasawi cited the university elections, saying that the press supports a certain faction against another faction.

Insofar as women's affairs are concerned, the press publishes articles that do not reflect the opinion of Kuwaiti women. The papers have published the pictures of some women who burned their veils and other such stories.

The lecturer demanded that news reports be transmitted honestly and without distortion or alteration, saying that these distortions and alterations are practiced by the papers. The lecturer also dealt with the press's position toward the Lebanese problem, saying that the papers deny the presence of the national forces, ask where these forces are and wonder why al-Murabitun has been hit in Lebanon.

The lecturer also tackled the issue of the supplements published with the papers, saying that they carry pictures of naked persons. He also wondered about the Kuwaiti press position toward housing problems and toward the group of people without a nationality.

He wondered why nothing is written about the usurious banks while criticism is focused on the Islamic banks?

Concluding, Wa'il al-Hasawi said that the press does not represent the people's opinions but the opinions of its owners and lords.

Colleague Isma'il a--Shatti, the chief editor of AL-MUJTAMA' magazine, then addressed the symposium, saying that Wa'il al-Hasawi expressed the concerns of Muslim fundamentalists with the press and demanded that full freedom be secured in this country, including the freedom of expression and of thought and political freedom which cannot be given or taken away.

He said that the freedom currently available is a relative and limited freedom as a result of several conditions existing in Kuwait. The fundamental factor here is the factor of maintaining security and stability. The lecturer described the political authority's intentions as good intentions and attributed the failure to grant more liberties to the flammable and changing situation in all respects. He said that the press represents the people in a relative and limited manner. He added that the Islamic tendency has the right to weekly freedom through some papers whereas the leftist or progressive tendency owns one or more papers and has a broader right to express its opinion.

At the sectarian level, al-Shatti said that some sects have no right to express their opinion because they influence the factor of security and stability in a fundamental way.

The lecturer attributed the monopolization of opinion and the failure to give the Muslim fundamentalists a chance to the intellectual terror they are rumored to engage in and to their accusing all those who disagree with them in opinion of being infidels and atheists, al-Shatti said that this claim is neither 100 percent true nor 100 percent wrong.

The floor was then opened for comments and questions by the audience. A member of the audience wanted to know colleague Ahmad al-Jarallah's view on whether "the press reflects the people's opinion." Al-Jarallah answered: Islam is the most advanced economic and social and even political system. He said that Islam is presented to people with the good word, not with wrath, adding that the task of the press is to represent the people. He said that the press does represent the people proportionally and that the Kuwaiti press tries as hard as possible to be close to public opinion. Al-Jarallah welcomed any article reaching AL-SIYASAH and said the newspaper objects to an article only when freedom turns into obscenity.

CONFLICT EMERGES BETWEEN PHALANGE, LEBANESE FRONT

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 331, 26 Mar 84 p 27

[Article: "A Secret War Between the Phalange and the Lebanese Front"]

[Text] When the leaders of Lebanon met for the sake of "dialogue" at the Swiss Beau Rivage Hotel, other events were racing along in total secrecy in the parts of Lebanon controlled by the Phalange Party and its allies in the Lebanese Front. These events proceeded in a fashion that led some observers to say that if the Lebanese dialogue ended well in Geneva, then another dialogue would begin among the allies of yesterday and the enemies of today to liquidate the scores that have piled up. Recently, these matters caused the conflicts and contradictions between the leaders of the Phalange, on the one hand, and the leaders of the Lebanese Front, on the other, to come to a head.

More than one report exists on the nature of that struggle. Its theater has been East Beirut, Kasrawan, and some regions of the south, and it at first took the form of a series of assassinations and mutual liquidations. In addition, several signs of the confusion and contradictions that predominate in the political and military institutions of the Phalange Party have appeared.

In this regard, some reports indicate that the militias of the Phalange are threatened with collapse because of their failure to encompass the youths of the Christian and Maronite communities, especially within the framework of mandatory conscription, since the military barracks are witnessing a movement of mass flight. By way of example, the available numbers say that more than 120 persons have fled from the Kafr Falus barracks alone, while more than 400 persons have fled from the training centers in Kasrawan. Similarly, this phenomenon reflects the extent to which the morale of the Phalangist militias has collapsed. On the other hand, the military leaders have taken a series of measures, such as making lists of the names of those who flee and erecting fixed and moveable barricades in preparation for their arrest. In addition, they have undertaken campaigns of raiding the homes of the inhabitants of the al-Ashrafiyah and 'Ayn al-Rummanah areas in search of the fugitives. Clashes have occurred in some cases, and eye witnesses have seen mothers blocking the trucks with their bodies in order to prevent the Phalangist police from taking their sons by force to be returned to the camps.

Moreover, the reports speak of broad movements that have encompassed numerous political and religious bodies and factions that reject the hegemony practiced by the Phalange over the Maronite sect and the other Christian sects. It has been repeated that these movements enjoy the support of some men of the Maronite Church. This has caused Samir Ja'ja', the commander of the Phalangist militias and the official in charge of mobilization to take certain measures. They have been said to include the issuing of direct threats against a clergyman and the granting of permission to the security agencies to gather information about any movements in this context, especially movements by Orthodox religious figures, including Patriarch Hazim.

It seems that the activities of Patriarch Hazim have worried the leading figures of the Phalange Party. They were a focus of discussion and study at a meeting to which he invited Fadi Ifram, who demanded that the Patriarch's activities be monitored, so that they could be discussed with the leading figures of the Lebanese Front and the danger could be met.

According to the reports of the Phalangist "Fifth Branch" concerning religious activity conducted in opposition to the Phalange, the Orthodox want to go beyond sectarian concepts to political concepts that take in a number of factors. These factors include the feeling -- present in the Christian community in general and the Maronite community in particular -- that there is a need for security and stability. They also include the successive defeats suffered by the militias and the resultant social and political situation that has arisen from them as a result of the losses that have afflicted the ranks of the young fighters, whose ages range from 16 to 25 years.

In addition to these two factors, there are others. They include the collapse of the wager on the Zionist alliance and the failure of the decision to opt for disengagement from the Arab world, in addition to international abandonment of the Phalange following the withdrawal of the multinational forces, the state of terror imposed on the inhabitants of the eastern areas, and the feeling on the part of the Christian citizens that they are living in a big prison under the pretext of combating the "strangers". At the same time, the Christian citizens think the security plan has succeeded in the other parts of the capital, which are controlled by the internal security forces.

All of these factors have led to economic collapse in the eastern areas, increasing taxes imposed by the militias, and the spreading of negative social phenomena.

For these reasons, the report by the Phalange's "Fifth Branch" points out that it is necessary to deal with the matter.

However, it seems that this "matter" has begun to escalate. The contradiction between the Phalange Party and the Maronite Patriarchate has begun to worsen in a public fashion. Among the indicators of this is the political activity of some clerics, which is proceeding along lines far removed from those of the Phalange.

Well informed sources say that a delegation from the Maronite Church recently visited the Vatican. There it was advised not to fall in behind the policy

of the Phalange Party and to leave the field open for the church to practice its natural role, far removed from this policy.

Other signs of this conflict are the activities said by the reports to be undertaken by Camille Sham'un. His actions are arousing the fears of the Phalange.

In light of the available information, the activities undertaken by Sham'un are intended to win back the trust of the Christian community and benefit from the experiences of the Phalange Party. They are an attempt to polarize the current within the Phalange Party and its militias that backs cooperation with Israel. This is what troubles the political leaders of the Phalange, especially President al-Jumayyil, his father, and Militia Commander Fadi Ifram.

These are the signs of the collapse from which the Phalange Party is suffering in the midst of an atmosphere of pessimism because of the sharp disputes in its ranks, which have reached the point of assassinations.

However, the strength of the party in the next stage will depend to a large extent on the result that will come out of the Geneva meeting and on how events will proceed inside Lebanon in the days ahead.

12224

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PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

POSTPONEMENT OF CAIRO SOLIDARITY CONFERENCE EXAMINED

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 51, 31 Mar 84 p 17

[Article by Ihsan Bakr: "The Complete Story of the Postponement of the Palestine Conference in Cairo"]

[Text] Suddenly, without any prior warning, after both official and popular circles in Cairo had completed all the preparatory measures for the opening of the World Conference in Support of the Palestinian People, and after the invitations had been sent and more than 250 noted international personalities from the various corners of the world had agreed to take part in the activities of the conference, with President Husni Mubarak having decided to participate personally in the activities and deliver an opening address alongside the speech of Mr Yasir 'Arafat, everything changed. Mr Yasir 'Arafat personally requested that the convening of the conference be postponed until 15 May, "in order to assure Palestinian participation with the highest and broadest possible representation, with emphasis being placed on the unity of Palestinian ranks and the embodiment of the principles of the revolution." In effect, the conference was postponed until further notice.

What happened? What is the complete story behind the postponement of the conference? Is it true that American and Israeli pressure was placed on Cairo to postpone it or transfer it outside of Cairo, or was foreign pressure--Soviet pressure in particular--exercised on the Palestinian leader, so that he would not go to Cairo and take part in the conference? In addition, was Palestinian pressure placed on Mr 'Arafat not to repeat his visit to Cairo?

Just as the Egyptian Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity decided to call for an international conference to be held in Cairo in support of the cause of Palestine, numerous questions were raised. Was it true that Egyptian officials agreed to organizing this huge popular demonstration, with its international dimension, in support of the PLO in the heart of Cairo? Would the Egyptian authorities agree to hold the conference in Egypt with such broad international representation, just as Egyptian-Israeli relations had reached their nadir? When the matter was presented to President Husni Mubarak, he evinced his personal agreement and completely welcomed the idea of Egypt hosting on its own land the leader of the Palestinian people and the representatives of the nations of the world, so that they could declare their support for the struggle of the Palestinian people and their legitimate right of self-determination.

After the arrangements had been completed, statements were repeated to the effect that American and Israeli pressure was being applied in order to ask Cairo not to host the conference, since to hold it there would violate the peace treaty with Israel. An official Egyptian source hastened at once to affirm that Egypt had decided to host the conference and would not change its decision. He added that Egypt's commitment to the Palestinian cause and the PLO was based on both principle and strategic considerations, and that Egypt would accept no interference in its internal affairs. He said the conference would be held at the set time and place.

Then things changed suddenly. An urgent telegram from Mr Yasir 'Arafat reached Ahmad Hamrush, the general secretary of the Egyptian Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity. The telegram requested that he go to Tunis to meet with the Palestinian leadership. Ahmad Hamrush traveled to Tunis along with Sa'id Kamal and Muhammad Sabih, the PLO's representatives in Egypt. He held a meeting at a headquarters of the Palestinian leadership in Tunis, which was attended by Mr Yasir 'Arafat and the members of the central committee of the Fatah movement: Abu Jihad, Hayil 'Abd-al-Hamid, and Hani al-Hasan. The meeting lasted for long hours. During it, Abu 'Ammar asked for the activities of the conference to be postponed. At a meeting held in Kuwait, he had asked the committee calling for the conference to postpone it until 30 March, so that he would be able to take part in its activities and so that the occasion would correspond with the celebrations of the Day of the Land.

The Text of 'Arafat's Letter

A long discussion was held, during which Ahmad Hamrush demonstrated his opposition to the postponement request. Then he returned to Cairo, bearing a letter from Mr Yasir 'Arafat to the committee calling for the conference. Here is the text of the letter:

Dear Brother Members of the Egyptian Committee for Afro-Asian People Solidarity, Revolutionary Greetings.

I did not wish to write this letter to you a few days before the convening of the conference, which you have organized for the sake of solidarity with the people of Palestine. I personally took part with you in the determination of its date as 30 March. However, out of my faith in your patriotism, the maturity of your consciousness, and your solicitude for deepening solidarity between the Egyptian and Palestinian peoples, I want to tell you frankly that despite my strong and real desire to come to Cairo, the pressure of the events obstructing the course of the Palestinians requires much from us in the way of effort, dialogue, and the exchange of views, in order to strengthen the positions of the revolution, affirm national unity, and put the Palestinian house in order. Therefore, I am writing to you in full awareness of the great difficulty and negative effects facing the process of postponement at this difficult time. I am eager to see the conference succeed, now that the strengthening and supporting of the democratic foundations in the institutions of the PLO have been affirmed. Although a delegation from us has been named to go to Cairo and take part in the activities of the conference, because of my eagerness to have our participation represent the PLO and the will of the Palestinian people at the highest level, I implore you to postpone the conference

to 15 May 1984, so that we will be able to make it a shining symbol of the joint struggle of the Egyptian and Palestinian peoples on the road of national liberation.

As I write to you, I feel great regret for the postponement of the opportunity provided to us at this time, when savage attacks are assailing the Arab nation. At the same time, I feel hopeful and trust that when the conference is held on its new date, 15 May 1984, it will be a summit of success and solidarity. I hope that all the problems associated with the postponement and the holding of the conference on its new date will be overcome, especially now that a prominent number of shining international personalities have agreed to participate in it. I offer complete coordination between the Egyptian solidarity committee and the offices of the PLO, in order to send joint delegations and contact invited organizations and personalities so as to confirm their attendance. We are committed to supporting the conference and overcoming all obstacles.

Finally, let me express to you once again my regret for the difficulty caused by the postponement suggestion. O brothers, I wish to send you my sincere respect for the effort you have exerted and the eagerness you have shown, as well as your support for solidarity with the Palestinian revolution. Through you, I wish to express my sincere thanks to the presidents and members of all the Egyptian parties that took the initiative in expressing their solidarity, in order to confirm the deep strategic relationship that links the people of Egypt and those of Palestine. Moreover, I thank President Muhammad Husni Mubarak and his government, which provided all the facilitations and facilities for holding this conference in the land of Egypt. Until we meet at your conference in Cairo on 15 May, I hope you will accept my best wishes for even greater success. Revolution until victory.

Your Brother,
Yasir 'Arafat

After his return to Cairo, Ahmad Hamrush summoned the Egyptian solidarity committee in order to discuss the recent developments. It was decided to postpone the conference until an as yet undetermined date.

The question now is: If Cairo has rejected all attempts to cancel or postpone the conference, what reasons compelled Mr Yasir 'Arafat to request a postponement until 15 May?

Palestinian sources said that this date means that the conference will be held after the end of the meetings of the Palestine National Council, which are expected to be held at the end of April. The same sources added that certain Palestinian factions have insisted on boycotting the Cairo conference. Indeed, via 'Abd-al-Muhsin Abu Mayzar, who is the PLO's representative at the secretariat of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, they have begun to encourage the personalities and countries participating in the conference not to attend or take part in its activities. Meanwhile, other sources think that the leadership of Fatah wanted to deny the rejectionists an opportunity and give the dialogue now going on between the Fatah leadership and both the Popular Front and the Democratic Popular Front a chance. Therefore,

Fatah thought that postponing the conference until mid-May would prevent new complexities from rising up before the Palestinian leadership. Thus, 'Arafat would come to Cairo after having had his legitimate leadership of the Palestinian people consecrated by the National Council.

Other sources stated that Moscow applied some pressure to the Palestinian leadership so that Yasir 'Arafat would not go to Cairo once again.

No matter what the reasons are, the Egyptian committee has acceded to the request of the Palestinian leader and postponed the convening of the conference.

12224
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PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

FATAH POSITION PAPER AT ADEN MEETING SUMMARIZED

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 52, 4 Apr 84 p 23

[Article: "Collective Leadership Confirmed, and the Independent Character of Palestinian Decision-Making Preserved"]

[Text] The Palestinian movement Fatah submitted a working paper at the Aden meeting in which it and the Popular and Democratic Fronts are participating in an attempt to overcome the currently frozen Palestinian situation and break out into a stage of renewed vitality that will revive the legitimate institutions and send new hope to the Palestinian masses, who have felt somewhat frustrated, especially after the rebel movement and the actions it took in the siege of Tripoli.

According to the copy obtained by AL-TADAMUN, the Fatah working paper contains two sections. The first is organizational and the second is political. The organizational portion focused on several matters, which can be summarized as follows:

1. Working in an urgent manner to convene the 17th session of the Palestine National Council, which is to include only the independent Palestinian organizations that did not participate in armed operations against the Palestinian camps in Damascus, the Bida' and Tripoli.
2. Strengthening national unity in a manner that confirms the collective nature of the leadership, and canceling the principle of unanimity in favor of the majority, within the framework of positive dialogue.
3. Implementing the organizational program approved by the National Council in a manner that affirms the unity of Palestinian institutions, while conducting the necessary joint consultation within the process of critical examination. This examination will not eliminate the security of these organizations or institutions, and it will have no effect on independent decision-making.
4. Strengthening the role of the Palestinian popular federations in the Arab and international arenas.

On the political side, the Fatah working paper explained in detail the Palestinian positions vis-a-vis various issues and countries. It was clear that

the greatest interest had been aroused at the meeting by matters having to do with relations with Syria, Egypt, Jordan, the Soviet Union and, finally, the rebels.

The Fatah working paper affirmed the following political points:

1. Rejection of the proposal of American President Reagan, since it expatriates the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and the establishment of their own independent state, while refraining from recognizing the PLO.
2. Rejection of the Camp David agreements and their appendices, especially autonomy, as well as each political position not based on the right of the Palestinian people to return, determine their destiny, and set up an independent state.
3. Commitment to the resolutions of the Arab summit in Fes as the bare minimum for Arab political activity in the international arena.
4. Consideration of the joint communique issued after the second phase of the talks between King Husayn and Mr Yasir 'Arafat as a basis for relations with Jordan. This relationship is to be built on clear, egalitarian foundations, with an orientation toward achievement of the goal of confederation with Jordan. In this regard, the paper made reference to the crystallization of the Jordanian position in a positive manner via King Husayn's readiness to build bilateral relations on the basis of unconditional talks and in light of the Jordanian monarch's recent statements concerning American policy.
5. Eagerness for a resumption of relations with Syria on the basis of independent national Palestinian decision-making and non-interference in Palestinian affairs.
6. Eagerness to arrange the Palestinian situation in Lebanon via joint coordination with the Lebanese nationalist fronts, thereby preserving the security and safety of the Palestinians.
7. Confirmation of the idea that the rapprochement with Egypt will occur in the degree to which Egypt distances itself from the Camp David policy. In this regard, there is to be coordination with the Egyptian national movement.
8. Firming up relations with the Soviet Union and the socialist countries, while working to include the Soviets in any solution to the Middle East problem within an international framework. In this regard, the paper pointed out that the magnitude of Soviet capability is influenced both positively and negatively by Arab-Soviet relations. The ability of the Soviets to act at our side increases as the magnitude of relations with Moscow increases.
9. Acting toward Europe so as to involve all the influential forces and nations capable of contributing in a prominent fashion to a just solution of the Middle East problem. The position of these countries and forces on the Palestinian issue must be developed in a progressive manner.

In this context, the paper referred to the importance of using the widening conflict of economic interest between Western Europe and the United States by intensifying political information activity in Europe in order to push the wheel of political change toward a European position that clearly recognizes the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and the establishment of their independent state on their national soil, while practically or semi-officially recognizing the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the people of Palestine.

10. The laying of the necessary plans for shaking Israeli society politically and socially by founding a department responsible for this task. The executive committee of the PLO will draw up these plans.

11. Supporting the joint Jordanian-Palestinian commission in the performance of its objectives in an effective manner, in order to support steadfastness in the occupied territories.

12. There should be no retraction or change in the position of the central committee on the rebels, who have lost their membership in the Fatah movement. The paper pointed out that the future of their existence as an independent organization was dependent on the will of the National Council.

12224

CSO: 4404/417

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

DISPUTE OVER WRITERS' MEETING--The dispute between the Palestinian leaders is being reflected these days in the Palestinian trade unions and vocational federations, especially the Federation of Palestinian Writers and Journalists. As a result of these disputes, the date for the convening of its general conference is alternately a matter of doubt and certainty. The members of the conference were informed that it would be held on 22 March. Just 2 days before that date, they were informed that the conference had been postponed until 3 April, after Mr Yahya Yakhla, the general secretary of the federation, issued a statement in which he announced that the federation's general secretariat still had not determined the date of the conference. Last week, doubts emerged once again concerning the possibility of holding the conference in Sanaa on 3 April 1984, after Mr Yakhla stated once again that the federation's general secretariat still had not decided on the date of the conference. At the same time, Mr Ghanim Zurayqat, the permanent secretary of the general secretariat, replied that the conference would be held on its new date.
[Text] [London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 51, 31 Mar 84 p 6] 12224

CSO: 4404/417

AFGHANISTAN

1978 COMMUNIST COUP, SOVIET INVASION BLASTED BY IRP ORGAN

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 26 Apr 84 p 15

[Text] Today, 27 April, is the sixth anniversary of the infamous and sinister Communist coup in the Islamic country of Afghanistan, which has become known in the political history of the Muslim Afghan nation as the "Seventh Sawr Coup" and marks the beginning of a new era in the revolutionary uprising of the oppressed Muslim nation of Afghanistan, the exposure of the domineering, tyrannical, hypocritical and ultimately decaying criminal superpower of the Soviet Union and its desperation vis-a-vis the resistance of an epic-creating nation which had brought the British aggressors to their knees three times before.

On 27 April 1978, at an extremely sensitive moment, the Soviet puppet Daud--who came to power with the help of the Soviet Union and the military forces which supported it, while engaging in his policy of turning to the West and preparing for the conference of the foreign ministers of the non-aligned countries--was overthrown in a coup d'etat planned by the Soviet Union and organized by the military personnel of the Marxist party, the so-called PDPA. With this, the Soviet Union took the first step to swallow Afghanistan and impose its direct domination over this Islamic country. Politically, this action, which meant the disruption of all the agreements between the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States concerning Afghanistan being a "neutral buffer" between the Soviet domain and the subcontinent, resulted in this Great Satan also engaging in dangerous adventurism in the region and bringing crisis and chaos to the region.

With the coup d'etat of 27 April, Nur Mohammed Taraki, the head of the "people's" faction of the PDPA, came to power and the weak coalition between the "khalq" and the "parcham" factions of this Party, which were created at the onset of the coup d'etat, was broken and soon the purges which are common to such regimes began. Meanwhile, with the exposure of the true nature of the coup regime and its infidel leaders, the Islamic resistance movement, which includes the entire godly Muslim nation of

Afghanistan, came on the scene with its special power and spread throughout Afghanistan. The Soviets and their functionaries, who found themselves helpless to stop the increasing uprising of the Muslims, began their severe actions and bloody violence. The flames of the uprising destroyed Taraki and another pawn, Hafizollah Amin, was brought to power in a coup d'etat. Despite the bloodbaths that he instigated, Amin did not succeed in misguiding the Islamic movement and silencing and suppressing the revolutionary uprising of the Muslim Afghan nation. On the contrary, these forces became more organized and with revolutionary joy and zeal expanded their resistance to the capital of Afghanistan and the vicinity of the Soviet Embassy. The Soviets, who had been frightened by the advancement of the Afghan freedom fighters and saw their domineering plans becoming ineffectual, engaged in military aggression and, killing Hafizollah Amin, brought Babrak Karmal as head of their aggressive forces to Afghanistan and installed him on the imposed throne of rule.

With this 120,000-troop aggression of the Soviet Red Army on Afghanistan, the Islamic movement and the epic-creating resistance of the Muslim nation of Afghanistan also became more expansive and solidified. In the course of these black six years of the military domination of the Soviet Union, not only has the myth of the so-called powerful Red Army been nullified, but more than 52,000 Soviet soldiers and officers, thousands of tanks and personnel carriers and dozens of the aggressor's helicopters and airplanes were also destroyed. In practice, certain events occurred in Islamic Afghanistan as a result of which, observers believe, the situation of the Soviet Union in this Islamic country has become like that of the United States in Lebanon and Vietnam.

Since their direct invasion, the Soviets, their functionaries and their Western rivals have held more than eight different regional and international conferences; but they have gained nothing from any of them. Nor did the use of chemical bombs and poison gases and the barbarous aggression on the farms, pastures and homes of the Muslim Afghan people solve any problems for the aggressors. Until the aggressive Soviet forces have been driven out of Afghanistan and an Islamic government has been established in that country, the Islamic uprising of the oppressed nation of Afghanistan will not subside. This uprising is a full-fledged Islamic revolution whose goal is to bring the word of God and establish the rule of the Koran. All the Muslim people of Afghanistan are participating in this great holy struggle and for this reason, the deviant spectrum of the monarchists, nationalists and compromisers who are making a vain effort on behalf of the United States and the whole West to change the course of the Islamic revolution have been rejected by the people, because the Islamic revolution relies on Islamic views

and ideological belief and is based on the philosophy of seeking martyrdom, which their oppressed Muslim nation has demonstrated in its heroic resistance. The day is not too far off when the Soviet forces and their domestic functionaries will be driven out of this Islamic country, similar to the forces of the Great Satan and NATO which were driven out of Lebanon. However, at this historical juncture, what is important for the Muslim combatants and the true Afghan freedom fighters is to preserve Islamic unity and revolutionary awareness vis-a-vis the different political conspiracies of the functionaries of the oppressive powers of the East and the West which have been fully mobilized against the Islamic revolution of Afghanistan to trample the blood of the martyrs of the Islamic revolution of this oppressed and brave nation with their tricks and poisonous propaganda. The fact is that the Islamic revolution of Afghanistan is advancing along its true path, ensuring the liberation of the oppressed people from the shackles and domination of the oppressors, because, as our revered imam has said, "This century, by the will of God, is the century for the victory of the oppressed over the oppressors."

God Almighty willing.

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CSO: 4640/211

COMMENTARY CASTS DOUBT OVER LEBANESE GOVERNMENT SUCCESS

GF090845 Tehran International Service in Turkish 1830 GMT 7 May 84

[From "The Movement of the Oppressed Is Bearing Its Fruits" program]

[Excerpts] Dear listeners, regardless of the pretexts put forward during the past few days for bringing to power a national unity government under Rashid Karami in Lebanon, exchanges of fire between the Muslim revolutionary forces and the Phalangist units and the armed forces of Amin al-Jumayyil are continuing at full force. The differences in views among the politicians in Lebanon over the national unity government is indicative of the fact that the problems facing that country are still continuing.

Each one of the said politicians, are competing in the effort made factions within the Lebanese community, are competing in the effort made to achieve a division of power. Thus, resolving the main conflict between the Muslim Lebanese people and the Phalangist government and the occupationist Zionists depends on the continuation of the armed struggle.

It is a fact that no matter what the structure of the so-called national unity government will be, resolving the crisis in Lebanon will be difficult. This can only be achieved through a serious consideration of the demand the Muslim people have put forward. Ending the occupation of south Lebanon is a matter of priority and the Muslim people of Lebanon cannot wait for conspiracies in the political arena. Nor can they wait for results. This is why they are continuing their determined struggle and resistance against the Zionist occupationists.

According to a report from Beirut, the mothers and relatives of 1,500 Muslims, who have been abducted and detained by the Phalangists in the prisons of the armed forces of al-Jumayyil, have marched through the streets of West Beirut. They carried the photographs of their abducted children and demanded the release of the Muslims held as captives. The demonstrators also distributed leaflets saying that so long as the abduction and imprisonment of revolutionary Muslims continue--just because they are Muslims and defending their homeland--the establishment of peace by the so-called national unity government will not be possible.

The Zionists tried to arrest revolutionary youths in (?al-Baria) village in the al-Zahrani region after laying a siege to the said village. However, the move caused a quick and strong reaction in the people. They countered the aggressive Zionist army units with stones and sticks. Nine people from the village were wounded as a result of the violent clash.

ADULTERY INTERPRETED 'IN NEW PENAL CODE'

Paris LE MONDE in French 16 Apr 84 p 5

[Article by Jean-Pierre Peroncel-Hugoz]

[Text] Rouhollah Khomeyni has never been, as far as we know, a monitor in an English public school where corporal punishment was the rule. Nonetheless, in his orders and his writings, he displays a strange taste for corporal punishment, applied to others, naturally. Moreover, he can, if need be, justify his inclination basing his argument on a literal reading of the Koran and the Tradition of Mohammad, but not on the spirit, which has been abandoned for the present, of a religion in which the name most often used for God is El Rahmene, the Merciful.

In the political science course which he gave in 1969 in Nedjef,* during his exile in Iraq, the Ayatollah Khomeyni, having postulated that "Islamic law is progressive, perfectionist, universal," undertook not only to explain the necessity for corporal punishment but even "the obligation which requires that blood be shed (to protect Islam)." He cites, in support of his statements, examples taken, he affirms, from the lives of Mohammad and of his son-in-law, Ali, the patron saint of Shi'ite Islam, which was imposed on Sunnite Persia by the Sefavid shahs in the sixteenth century.

According to Professor Khomeyni, the prophet of Islam "was not content to present penal laws but was also quick to put them into practice: he stoned, cut off hands, etc." The Iman Ali is said to have acted similarly, adding compassion to severity: "Ali, after having cut off the hands of two thieves, treated them with kindness and received them with such graciousness that the culprits began to venerate him."

The former exile of Neauphe-le-Chateau, rather than getting involved directly--he would have been kept busy: thousands of Iranians have been executed or punished in the name of Islamic justice since 1979--has decreed strict rules for the "crime" of adultery. A couple of dozen articles in the new penal code are devoted to it. The founding president of the Swiss humanitarian organization Terre des Hommes, Edmond Kaiser, sent us a translation of these articles.

*Translated from the Persian by M. Kotobi, B. Simon and O. Banisadre and published in 1979 by Fayolle Editions, under the title "For an Islamic Government."

One Man is Worth Two Women

Adultery must have been reported by "four just men" (Moslems of course) or "three men and two just women"--for in Moslem law the word of a man is worth that of two women. In addition, "the testimony of women...is not sufficient to prove adultery." Well!

Adultery is punished by death in four cases: if it takes place with a close relative, with a stepmother, through violence, or if it takes place between a non Moslem man and a Moslem woman. Capital punishment by lapidation is legal only if both the adulterous man and woman are married. In that case "the size of the stones must not be so great that one or two stones could kill, nor so small that they could not be called stones." "It is recommended...that a large number of believers be present (at the lapidation) and that there be a minimum of three."

If the guilty are not married and are lucky enough not to fit into any of the other categories mentioned above, "the punishment for adultery...is one hundred lashes." A married man who, if he is so fortunate, ejaculated "without penetrating" his mistress--no possibility seems to be overlooked--will have "his head shaved and will be exiled for a year."

But woe to those who are caught fornicating illegally "during a religious festival or mourning;" they will receive corporal punishment before being killed....

8956
CSO: 4619/40

PAKISTAN

TAHRIK-E ISTIQLAL LEADER COMMENTS ON MRD, U.S. AID

Lahore CHATAN in Urdu 13-20 Feb 84 pp 11-16

[Interview with Chaudhari Aitzaz Ahsan, leader of the Tahrik-e Istiqlal Party; date and place not specified]

[Excerpts] [Question] If I were to repeat what most people are saying, that the MRD [Movement for the Restoration of Democracy] failed in its campaign to restore democracy in Pakistan, would you agree?

[Answer] I would certainly disagree. In my view, the MRD carried on a most important and, from a historical point of view, most successful campaign under the most difficult and unfavorable conditions in this country. I use the word "historical" deliberately because the verdict of history is not delivered in 1 day but is a continuous process. Judged in the light of this process, the 1983 MRD campaign is much more important than past campaigns conducted in this country.

This was the first and only campaign against martial law violence carried out peacefully and without arms. Up to now, there has not been any such peaceful campaign of noncooperation conducted in the subcontinent against a martial law government. The law courts are utterly powerless under martial law and are unable to redress the grievances of those working in the campaign and being arrested.

The campaigns against Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan and the National Alliance Campaign did not have to face such a situation. The sword of article 49 of the martial law hangs over the press as well; political parties and political activities are totally banned. Moreover, during this campaign, courts held only brief hearings and imposed sentences of imprisonment, flogging and fines of hundreds of thousands of rupees on large numbers of party workers. These workers cannot expect any redress from the high courts and the Supreme Court. A campaign that was conducted under such conditions, the sacrifices that were made by all those people who went to jail, who went into the streets in large cities shouting for democracy and offering themselves for arrest even though they knew that they would be handed stiff sentences by the military court and that they would have no recourse--all these things show that the experiment was a novel one that cannot be measured by the standards of the campaigns of 1946 [sic] or 1977.

Those two campaigns took shape after months of open and free electioneering and political activity. Take, for example, the campaign of National Alliance of Pakistan; up to 7 March 1977, National Alliance arranged for several thousand meetings during the election campaign; organized processions; used loudspeakers, Jeeps and wagons without hindrance; published posters, flags and advertisements; and even broadcast speeches on the government-owned television. By the time they reached the stage of campaign and resistance, they had already aroused the greater part of the populations of large cities. Those people also had recourse to courts. All the lawyers arrested in April 1977 had their petitions heard by the High Court and were allowed to appear before the court. M. Anwar, Mian Mahmud Ali Qusuri, Amir Reza Khan appeared before the High Court on the third day and were finally released after a few weeks. None of our leaders or workers enjoyed these facilities nor were we allowed, before the campaign, to participate in free and open political activity for 2 or 3 months, to hold processions or to meet.

In spite of all this, the MRD campaign has been the longest such campaign of the subcontinent. Even the 1942 "Quit India" movement did not last as long; however, during that campaign, held under foreign rulers, the courts and the newspapers were not as helpless as they are today.

During preventive house arrest, for the first time senior lawyers such as myself were not accorded the courtesy of a general postponement of cases by the High Court and the Supreme Court. I cannot recall that this has ever happened before. As far as the historical importance of this campaign is concerned, I would like to draw your attention to two points: first, there is not a single journal or newspaper, a political party or personality in this country, with the exception of the government itself, that does not fully and unconditionally support the MRD objectives. In 1971, when the Bengalis were being oppressed, many newspapers and journals advocated sending troops. Today, thanks to MRD's positive policy and campaign, not a single newspaper or journal supported the government's action in sending troops to Sind. On the contrary, one finds that even in Punjab the people have realized that the demands of the small provinces are the result of the absence of democracy. This is the basic difference between the Punjab of 1971 and the Punjab of 1983; and, undoubtedly, the Pakistan federation will gain strength as a result of this new way of thinking that bears the stamp of the MRD alone. The second outstanding point is that although, according to Minister of the Interior Mahmud Haroon, 61 demonstrators were killed in Sind Province--our information puts the number much higher--even so, it was because of the MRD that not a single non-Shindhi individual, his house or his shop were attacked. The basis for a federation of the right kind is to be found in the MRD and its way of thinking; and the Pakistan federation can be preserved only through such democratic and constitutional thought and action. It is thus entirely incorrect to say that the MRD campaign has failed.

[Question] Provincial autonomy: Benazir Bhutto, Hani Ramay, Malik Mohammad Qasim, all have spoken. What is the opinion of Tahrik-e Istiqlal regarding provincial autonomy?

[Answer] There are different aspects to the question of provincial autonomy. A fundamental and clear point on which the MRD parties agree and to which Tahrik-e Istiqlal also definitely subscribes is that Pakistan should, without delay, agree on this formula and restore to the provinces all those rights that were bestowed on them by the 1973 constitution. This is the most important and basic need of the present situation. All political parties agree on this; and Tahrik-e Istiqlal also holds that the provinces should be given autonomy in accordance with and under the 1973 constitution. The same point is included in the MRD's basic objectives.

It is also a fact that certain individuals and areas are demanding greater autonomy than was given them under the 1973 constitution. The basic reason for this demand is the prolonged martial law. This is not the first time that, in reaction against military government in the country, demands for autonomy have increased and intensified. During Ayub Khan's term of office, Mujibur Rahman's "Six Points" appeared on the political horizon, and during Yahya Khan's martial law government, his demands became so strident and sharp that finally they became the basis for a free and independent country.

In fact, Newton's law, that any action creates a reaction of equal force, underlies this whole sequence of events because during martial law, centralization reaches its zenith. It is obvious, therefore, that as a reaction to this centralization, federal elements adopt a hard attitude in their search for a separate identity. Demands for provincial autonomy take root in and are nurtured by the centralized and unitary system of the provincial machinery. The situation now is that on the one hand provinces have been deprived over the past 7 years of even the autonomy allowed them under the 1973 constitution. On the other hand, because of the prolonged martial law, the inhabitants of the provinces are demanding even greater powers than those given to them under the 1973 constitution. Like Mujibur Rahman's "Six Points," the present situation also is an ideological reaction to martial law; and if martial law continues, this reaction will intensify.

In view of this situation, we support, on the one hand, the provincial autonomy specified under the 1973 constitution, and on the other hand, we also believe that the voices raised by the small provinces should be appeased even though these voices have been raised in reaction to the centralization created by the present martial law's unitary system. Undoubtedly, the prolonged martial law has provoked these protests and demands; but the present situation demands that the voices of the small provinces be heard and the new desires of their inhabitants somehow fitted into the framework of the federal republic.

Only one basic point has not been discussed so far and that is: If it is felt that a change of some sort is needed in the balance of provincial autonomy under the 1973 constitution, then, in our opinion, only the elected representatives of the people have the right to make such changes. Hence, our stand is certainly different from that taken by the "U.S. returned" former chief of minister of Punjab [Hanif Ramay]. We are opposed to any constitutional amendments before elections and we even consider a transitional constitution unconstitutional. In our view, no single individual has the

right to amend the 1973 constitution. The "U.S. returned" former chief minister wants the present ruling authorities to amend the constitution's provisions regarding provincial autonomy. This course of action is in reality intended to strengthen the hand of the martial law administration, whereas we want to see a strong constitutional, republican, parliamentary and federal system under which, on the basis of a unanimous vote, provincial autonomy would be extended as far as possible.

[Question] In view of the planes and weapons supplied by the United States, how far should Pakistan trust this "friend?"

[Answer] First of all, on the basis of past experience, it would be a mistake to count the United States among Pakistan's friends. In 1965, during the war between India and Pakistan, Pakistan had a defense pact with the United States signed in 1955. But not only did the United States not help Pakistan, it even stopped supplying badly needed spare parts for Pakistan's fighter planes, tanks and guns. In 1971, Gen Yahya Khan was under the impression that since through his mediation Kissinger was able to pay a secret visit to China instead of touring Nathiagali, thus reestablishing relations between the United States and China, the United States would not allow Yahya's forces to drown in the morass of East Pakistan. But the famed U.S. Seventh Fleet continued to carry on war maneuvers 500 miles from the Bay of Bengal while Yahya Khan's deputy, General Niazi, together with all his troops, surrendered their arms to General Arora in Dhaka's Paltan Maidan. After all these experiences, would it not be childish to expect anything from the United States?

The United States has never come to the aid of any of its friends, with the exception of Israel. Israel is the only country to which the entire wealth and strength of the United States is devoted and the reason is that the American economy is in effect controlled by the Jews. I think that if, instead of a few planes, the United States were to give all of its naval forces and air squadrons to Pakistan, it would still be dangerous to place any trust in the United States. It would be best for us to abstain from relying on either the superpowers and to adopt nonaligned policies in the true sense of the word.

9863
CSO: 4656/111

PAKISTAN

PROPOSED OFFER OF BASES TO U.S. OPPOSED

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 15 Apr 84 p 10

[Editorial: "Mr Khatak's Advice"]

[Text] Muslim League leader Mr Yusuf Khatak has again stressed the advisability of letting the United States have bases in Pakistan if it asks for them. He says a superpower like Russia has reached our borders after occupying Afghanistan. The Soviets are displeased with our foreign policy. America will not come to our aid against Russia, because our friendship with it is not deep-rooted enough. Mr Khatak is a veteran politician, and he has certainly given this advice in the interests of Pakistan's independence and integrity. But when we look at this recommendation in the light of our previous defense pacts with the United States, the advice seems to be far from sound and is positively unrealistic. It is a fact, whether we like it or not, that India has always been America's first choice, and it has proved this at every step. In 1962 Pakistan was America's ally in SEATO and CENTO, but on the excuse of India's border clash with China, the United States gave India heaps of ammunition, which 3 years later India used against Pakistan. On the other hand, the United States refused to give Pakistan even spare parts for the arms that had been given to it in military aid.

Pakistan has always been America's next preference after India, and even that under some pressure. In India, the Soviets have invested so much in arms and industry that even if the Indian rulers wanted to they could not break away from Soviet influence. India's policy on Afghanistan is a proof of this. In meetings of the Commonwealth and nonaligned countries, India recommends the recall of Soviet armies from Afghanistan and the restoration of its status as a free and nonaligned country, but it is all lip service. In private, it is all for Soviet policies. India's hypocrisy is no secret, but the United States continues to pamper it.

Under these conditions, expecting any benefit from America is mere wishful thinking on the part of Mr Khatak. Pakistan has a defense pact with the United States (1959), but the interpretation that former national security advisor Brzezinski gave it on his recent visit to Pakistan was nothing less than an invitation to India to attack Pakistan. Whatever interest America has in defending Pakistan, it is connected with its own global interests.

The United States is strong enough to protect its interests even without bases in Pakistan. Offering bases to the United States or giving them on demand will make Pakistan lose the prestige that it has among Muslim and nonaligned countries. Moreover, Pakistan is now trying to have good relations with the Soviets in the field of industry and commerce. Giving bases to the United States will not only disrupt these efforts but might even make the Soviets our sworn enemies. We can protect our freedom and integrity not by giving bases to the United States but only by strengthening our national unity and increasing our self-reliance and self-effort.

12476
CSO: 4656/136

PAKISTAN

AMERICAN AID TERMED NO SUBSTITUTE FOR SELF-RELIANCE

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 15 Apr 84 p 10

[Editorial: "American Aid No Substitute for National Unity"]

[Text] Deputy Secretary of State Howard Schaffer has stressed before the House of Representatives the necessity of the \$630,000,000 aid set aside by the Reagan administration in the 1985 budget to help Pakistan economically and to sell it arms. He referred to Pakistan as a major Islamic country of the region and said that its stability is crucial for peace and security in that part of the world. He said that if Pakistan becomes weak and disintegrated, it will lead to internal turmoil in the country and increase the danger of external interference. While speaking about giving financial aid to Pakistan, Mr. Schaffer made reference to the implications of the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan and also mentioned India's hue and cry against aid to Pakistan. He said that Pakistan's military and economic well-being is essential to stop Soviet expansionism and aggression in this region. He said Pakistan has resisted Soviet pressure with great determination. As for the hue and cry from India, he said that giving Pakistan arms and a little financial help will make no difference to India, which will continue to be superior to Pakistan in military strength.

Mr Schaffer's explanation becomes significant when we remember the stiff conditions proposed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. These conditions were connected with Pakistan's nuclear energy program. The conditions were not adopted in full, but they indicate how strong and active the anti-Pakistan Jewish lobby is in the U.S. Congress. It is characteristic of the U.S. administration that it has to go through a lot of trouble to get anything sanctioned by the Congress. When the administration wants to take a step in the wider interests of the nation, the different lobbies try to put hurdles in its path. But this is a price that every needy country (except Israel) has to pay to get American aid. For Israel, Congress adds generously to the fabulous sums of money that the administration wants to give.

The aid program that the Reagan administration has devised for Pakistan is spread over 5-6 years. Each year's program has to be endorsed by the Congress. The Reagan administration is trying to complete a program of aid for Pakistan, but if Reagan loses the 1984 election, that will have an adverse effect on this program. This possibility was present in 1981, too, but we had to

face it. Whatever the outcome of the 1984 elections may be, Pakistan has gained military strength from America's sale of arms [to it]. If Reagan is not reelected, there may be some changes in America's policy, but the international conditions that led America to give aid to Pakistan will remain as they are today. We stress this point just now because whenever aid to Pakistan is discussed in the American Congress and a voice of dissent is raised, some people here are disappointed, but those who want to hand Pakistan over to the Soviets or to their ally, India, become very happy and vocal. They magnify all that is said in the U.S. Congress against giving aid to Pakistan.

Pakistan's freedom and integrity cannot be protected by joining the Soviets after leaving the United States. To protect our country, we will have to put our own house in order and achieve national unity. However important American aid may be for economic and defensive purposes, it can never be a substitute for national unity and the development of our own national resources. If we are cool-headed and think realistically, our reaction to the American attitude will be balanced and positive and America will have to take note of it.

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END